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The United States and the International
Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful




In the final year of George W. Bush's presidency, proponents of
international criminal justice had a reason to be optimistic. The impending
change in U.S. administration appeared to signal the end of a then long-standing
tension between the United States and the International Criminal Court
(hereinafter "ICC" or "Court"). 1 After a decade of dormancy, the prospect of the
United States joining the ICC appeared to have been surprisingly resurrected,
representing a shift in U.S. policy of potentially remarkable magnitude. The
possibility of U.S. membership, virtually unthinkable during George W. Bush's
two-term presidency, became viable when the 2008 presidential nominations
were secured, as each of the leading candidates had publicly expressed their
desire to see the United States become a part of the institution.2
*Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law; Visiting Assistant
Professor of Law, Albany Law School (2010-2011). My sincere thanks go to Professor William A.
Schabas and Professor Ray Murphy, both of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, as well as to Noah
Weisbord, for thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this article. I am also grateful to the
students in my International Criminal Procedure Seminar at FIU for the candid and enthusiastic
discussions that planted the seed for this article and thank Aileen and Maca for (indirectly)
facilitating its writing.
1. Created pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Then-Senator and future Republican presidential candidate John McCain was quoted as
saying, "I want us in the ICC," although he tempered his comments by expressing dissatisfaction
with the Court's safeguards. Press Release, Citizens for Global Solutions, Citizens for Global
Solutions Applauds Senator McCain's Support of the ICC (Jan. 28, 2005), available at
http://archivel.globalsolutions.org/press-room/press releases/press releases05/icc mccain.html. As
a Senatorial candidate, Democrat Barack Obama answered "Yes" to the question "Should the United
States ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?" Citizens for Global Solutions,
2008 Presidential Candidate Questionnaire, Response from Barack Obama,
528
2011] THE US. ANDINT'L CRIMINAL COURTPOST-BUSH
Now, just over two years into the Obama presidency, the world has
witnessed renewed and significant U.S. engagement with the Court. In the wake
of senior members of the Obama administration both praising the ICC and
lamenting the fact that the United States is not a part of the Court, the United
States was represented at the annual meeting of the ICC's Assembly of States
Parties-for the first time ever-in late 2009. In mid 2010, a strong U.S.
contingency was then sent to Kampala, Uganda to attend the ICC Review
Conference as observers.3 Perhaps most remarkably, in February 2011, the
United States not only voted in favor of a United Nations Security Council
resolution referring the conflict in Libya to the Court,4 it actually lobbied other
states on the Council to support the referral. 5
This progress, considered alongside the thus-far non-threatening work of
the Court, provides a timely opportunity to consider the future of the U.S.
relationship with the ICC. Amidst handshakes and promises of continued
cooperation with the ICC, is there a reason to think that the relationship between
the United States and the Court will become something more? This article
addresses that question.
It does so by first critiquing the shifts in the U.S. approach to the ICC, from
the Clinton administration to the Obama administration, in view of the Court's
framework and work to date. It then analyzes the recent amendments made to
the ICC Statute regarding the controversial crime of aggression. Concluding that
in this respect the U.S. delegation's Kampala mission was a qualified success,
this article then considers the effect of that outcome on the U.S. perception of
the Court. As its final area of inquiry, this article examines the early work of the
International Criminal Court in an effort to determine whether the ICC is in fact
fulfilling its mission to act as a "court of last resort." 6
Establishing that the Court is not currently poised to fulfill the role of a
"court of last resort," this article posits that there is no present incentive for the
United States to ratify the Statute of the Court. Put simply, the ICC's existing
approach to case admissibility neither provides adequate evidence that the Court
is on a path that assures its anti-impunity goal nor comports with the United
http://www.globalsolutions.org/08orbust/pcq/obama (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
3. The long-awaited meeting presented the first opportunity for the States Parties to amend
the Rome Statute, a process in which the U.S. delegation participated actively and arguably with
some success. See infra section III.
4. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). A Security Council
referral is one of three ways in which the ICC's jurisdiction can be triggered. See infra note 22 and
accompanying text. This marked the first time that the United States voted in favor of such a referral.
5. The United States was one of the four states that circulated the resolution referring the
situation in Libya to the Court. Edward Wyatt, Security Council Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in
Libya, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011. "The U.K., France, Germany and U.S. spent eight hours
overcoming opposition in the council by several countries to the ICC referral." Joe Lauria, U.N.
Imposes Sanctions on Gadhafi, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2011.
6. See infra section IV B.
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States' clear preference to see justice performed at the national level.7
Accordingly, this article concludes with some thoughts regarding the changes
that will need to be made in order to make U.S. accession a reasonable
possibility. It advocates for the Court's prosecutor to facilitate the ICC's anti-
impunity mission by focusing solely on situations where justice would not be
served other than with the intervention of the ICC. It also recognizes that,
difficult though they may be to effectuate, amendments to the ICC Statute by the
Assembly of States Parties may be necessary in order to decisively establish that
it is national jurisdictions that bear the primary responsibility for prosecuting the
egregious crimes that fall within the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. U.S. Participation in the Drafting Process of the Court's Statute
Despite the relatively short existence of the International Criminal Court,
the United States has managed to develop a notably extensive-and somewhat
checkered-history with the institution. In the early 1990s, the possibility of
U.S. support for a permanent international criminal justice institution seemed
unlikely, as the United States then harbored "a residual mistrust of international
tribunals."8 However, when confronted by "egregious violations of international
law [that might] go unpunished because of a lack of an effective national forum
7. "Our long-term vision is the prevention of heinous crimes through effective national law
enforcement buttressed by the deterrence of an international court." Ambassador David J. Scheffer,
War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects, Address at the Conference Convocation for
the Washington College of Law Conference, in 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1389, 1396 (1998). Stephen
J. Rapp, current Ambassador at Large for War Crime Issues, further noted:
Certainly, the U.S. Government places the greatest importance on assisting
countries where the rule of law has been shattered. . . . At the same time, the
United States recognizes that there are certain times when justice will be found
only when the international community unites in ensuring it, and we have been
steadfast in our encouragement for action when the situation demands it.
Speech to Assembly of States Parties, Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues,
United States of America, Nov. 19, 2009, [hereinafter Rapp Speech], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdoes/aspdoes/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-GenDeba-USA-ENG.pdf. The U.S.
preference to see justice performed at the national level is not peculiar to the ICC. See e.g. Goran
Sluiter, Using the Genocide Convention to Strengthen Cooperation with the ICC in the Al Bashir
Case, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 365, 367 (2010) (noting a parallel view with respect to Article VI of the
Genocide Convention).
8. Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About the International Criminal Court, 6 PACE INT'L
L. REV. 103, 105 (1994). Scharf partially attributes this wariness to the finding of jurisdiction and
justiciability by the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. 392. Id. at 105 n.5
(internal citations omitted).
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for prosecution," 9 such as high profile attacks on U.S. peacekeepers by Somali
warlords,' 0 the U.S position gave way to an understandable and sharp change in
policy." In this respect, President Clinton ultimately set the stage for active
U.S. participation in the creation of a permanent international criminal court,
expressing support for an institution that could serve to fill an unsettling
impunity gap and potentially deter atrocity crimes. 12
The United States went on to play a noteworthy role in the early
development of the ICC 13 and, as the idea of establishing the Court gained
momentum, 14 in the creation of its draft statute. 15 Congressional backing for the
future court was also strong at that time. In fact, a 1997 joint resolution of
Congress called upon the President "to continue to support and fully participate
in negotiations at the United Nations [and] to conclude an international
agreement to establish an international criminal court."16 Complete participation
followed, as the United States continued to be an influential party in the drafting
of the ICC Statute, later named the Rome Statute, which was ultimately adopted
in 1998.17 Even though the United States voted against the final draft of the
9. Scharf, supra note 8, at 109 (quoting Press Release, United States Mission to the United
Nations, Statement by the Honorable Conrad K. Harper, United States Special Advisor to the United
Nations General Assembly in the Sixth Committee, U.S.U.N. Press Release #171-(93) (1993)).
10. "If U.N. peacekeepers catch Gen. Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the Somali warlord whose
munition dumps are periodically blown up by U.S. air forces, no one is quite sure what to do with
him. The goal is to arrest him. There is, however, no international law to accuse him of violating,
and no court in which to try him." Don Noel, Dodd's Court Would Move the World Closer to the
Rule of Law, HARTFORD COURANT, July 12, 1993, at Cll; see also Editorial, A Court for
International Outlaws, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1993, at A16 (observing that Somalia's lack of a
functioning government creates an impunity gap for warlords committing crimes against
peacekeepers on Somali territory).
11. Scharf, supra note 8, at 109 (describing the shift as "a major U.S. policy and strategy
reversal on the issue of an ICC").
12. "[The creation of a permanent court would] send a strong signal to those who would use
the cover of war to commit terrible atrocities that they cannot escape the consequences of such
actions." John F. Harris, Clinton Pushes for U.N. War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1995,
at A4. (quoting Clinton).
13. "From 1995 to 1998, the United Nations General Assembly convened two committees to
produce what was called a "consolidated text" of the Draft Statute for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (ICC)." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, 443 (1999) (internal
citations omitted).
14. See e.g. G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. GAOR, 51" Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/207 (Dec. 17,
1996) (reaffirming the mandate of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court and calling for a 1998 conference of plenipotentiaries "with a view to
finalizing and adopting a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court").
15. Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 177, 178 (1997) (noting that
the US took "the most active role" on many of the major issues addressed in 1996).
16. 103 H.R.J. Res. 89, 105th Cong. (1997).
17. See, e.g., Bartram S. Brown, The Statute of the ICC: Past, Present and Future in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
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Statute, 18 it maintained a prominent position in the later work of the Preparatory
Commission, 19 helping to develop both the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence designed to direct the work of the Court. 20
B. The Rome Statute
The Rome Statute grants the Court subject matter jurisdiction over war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. 2 1 In
order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over one or more of these crimes, an
investigation must be "triggered." The Court's prosecutor must either receive a
referral of a situation by a State Party or by the Security Council, or must make
an independent determination to initiate an investigation. 22 Investigations
initiated on the prosecutor's own motion (proprio motu) require authorization
from the Court's Pre-Trial Chamber,23 a judicial filter designed to add an
element of accountability to the prosecutor's investigatory choices. Except in the
INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 109 (Sarah B. Sewell & Carl Kaysen, eds., 2000) (attributing to Theodor
Meron, a U.S. citizen-advisor at the Rome Conference, the observation that the statute's due process
protections and mens rea requirements "reflected a strong American influence" and that much of the
Court's substantive law caused him to conclude that "American fingerprints are all over [the]
document"); see also David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court,
35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 73 (2001-02) (maintaining that "the United States achieved many of its
negotiating objectives at the Rome Conference"); William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the
International Criminal Court: It's All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 701, 709
(2004) [hereinafter Schabas, Security Council] (crediting the United States with having positively
contributed to the drafting of the Rome Statute as to both its substantive and procedural law).
18. "There were a few very fundamental issues which either have to be accommodated within
the treaty text or they present very severe difficulties for the United States government. . . .
[A]ccommodations were not achieved in the negotiations, and therefore we were not in a position to
support the text as it came out of Rome." On the Record Briefing at Foreign Press Center, Federal
Document Clearing House, Jul. 31, 1998, available at 1998 WL 431804 (statement of David
Scheffer, then Ambassador-At-Large Designate For War Crimes Issues) (hereinafter Scheffer
statement]. The issues that precluded U.S. approval are considered in greater detail infra section II
A.
19. As a signatory to the Final Act in Rome, a document that acknowledges the events of the
Rome Conference and was signed by nations that participated in its negotiations, the U.S. earned the
right to be a part of the Commission. Ellen Grigorian, The International Criminal Court Treaty:
Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional Concerns, Congressional Research Service Report,
Report RL 30020, at 23 (updated Jan. 6, 1999), available at http://fortunaty.net/org/
wikileaks/CRS/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL30020.pdf.
20. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 74.
21. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1). At present, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction
over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide; the Court will not be able to exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until at least Jan. 1, 2017. Resolution RC/Res.4, Annex I,
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression,
art. 15 bis (2) and (3); 15 ter (2) and (3) [hereinafter Amendments to the Rome Statute]. The
definition of the crime of aggression and its jurisdictional reach is discussed at length, infra section
III.
22. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13 (a)-(c).
23. Id. art. 15(3) and (4).
[Vol. 29:2
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case of a Security Council referral, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction is limited
by the requirement of either personal or territorial jurisdiction. As such, the
Court has the authority to hear cases involving nationals of states that are parties
to the Statute, as well as those involving crimes allegedly committed on the
territories of states that are parties to the Statute.24 It is this latter aspect that
makes it possible for nationals of states that are not a party to the Rome Statute
to be prosecuted before the ICC. However, any state, regardless of its
membership status, may preclude the Court from exercising jurisdiction over a
case by conducting a genuine, domestic investigation into the matter and, if
necessary, a prosecution. 25 To this end, at the behest of the United States, 26 the
Statute's preamble stresses "the duty of every state to exercise its jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes." 2 7
II.
THE U.S. AND THE ICC: A TALE OF THREE ADMINISTRATIONS
A. The Signing of the Rome Statute and Clinton's Concerns
The United States became a signatory to the treaty at the close of 2000
under then-President Clinton. While President Clinton's accompanying
statement reiterated U.S. commitment to international accountability and the
prosecution of those alleged to have violated the crimes within the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction, it also concluded that the Rome Statute contained
"significant flaws."2 8 Specifically, President Clinton cited the Court's claim of
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states, concern regarding "unfounded
charges" being brought against U.S. officials, and the resultant prospect of
"politicized prosecutions." 2 9
The first noted flaw was frequently cited by the United States from an early
stage, 30 despite there being arguably little basis for the criticism. With the
exception of matters referred by the Security Council, the ICC is only able to
hear a case involving a U.S. national (i.e. a national of a non-party state) if the
24. Id. art. 12(2).
25. Id. art. 17 (1) (a), (b) and (c).
26. Jeffrey L. Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. &POL'Y 281, 285 (1996-1997).
27. Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamb. 6, art. 1 (stressing that the ICC is complementary to
domestic justice systems).
28. Statement by the President: Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31,
2000), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonlylibrary/hotreleases/December_31_2000.html.
29. Id.; see also Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 93 (1999); William K. Lietzau, International Criminal Law after Rome: Concerns
from a U.S. Military Perspective, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (2001); Schabas, Security Council,
supra note 17, at 709-712 (2004).
30. See Scheffer statement, supra note 18; see also David J. Scheffer, The United States and
the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 18 (1999).
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alleged crime takes place on the territory of a state party.3 1 In the same way, a
national of the United States would be subject to the jurisdiction of a second
state if accused of having committed a crime on its territory. 32 As a result, this
argument against signing the Statute has a primarily visceral appeal, 33
suggesting that the shift in the U.S. position-from Court proponent to critic-
was more likely attributable to an unstated motive. 34
In this respect, commentators have noted that U.S. opposition to the ICC
surfaced at a time when early plans for the Court, which featured a prominent
role for the United Nations Security Council ("Security Council" or "UNSC"),
gave way to a different vision in which the Security Council was comparatively
sidelined.35 Rather than employ an approach that essentially dictated prior
UNSC approval of every ICC investigation and prosecution, 36 the draft statute
was ultimately revised in such a way that the UNSC has more limited abilities.
As amended, the UNSC shares with States Parties and the ICC prosecutor the
power to trigger the Court's jurisdiction with respect to a situation37 and also
has the authority to defer for a period of twelve months an ICC investigation or
prosecution by way of a Chapter VII Resolution. 38
There is no doubt that this transformation significantly altered the playing
field for the United States. Ex ante, UNSC approval would have meant that no
ICC investigation could proceed without at least the tacit approval of each
permanent Security Council member,39 of which the United States is one. 40 This
approach would have given the United States indirect control over the ICC
docket, thereby assuring that no American would be prosecuted at the Court
without U.S. consent. To attain the same outcome with an ex post deferral,
however, the United States would have to successfully lobby the support of the
31. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(a).
32. "The principle that the courts of the place where the crime is committed may exercise
jurisdiction has achieved universal recognition, and is but a single application of the essential
territoriality of the sovereignty, the sum of legal competences, which a state has." IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (3d ed. 1979).
33. For a different perspective, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 199 (2001) (arguing that, at least in cases "where the charged conduct
consists of the faithful execution of official policy, the state remains a real party in interest").
34. Schabas, Security Council, supra note 17, at 712-17.
35. Id. at 717.
36. While this method was not affirmatively prescribed, the original draft language had the
effect that an ICC prosecution would not be possible unless the Security Council decided to make it
so. Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(B) and 16 in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTS 143,149-50 (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999).
37. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13.
38. Id. art. 16. See also Schabas, Security Council, supra note 17, at 717.
39. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. (requiring "an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members" in order for the Security Council to render a
decision on non-procedural matters).
40. Id. art. 23, para. 1.
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four remaining permanent members in order to secure a resolution to that
effect. 4 1 In this respect, as Professor William Schabas rightly notes, the eleventh
hour U.S. opposition to the Court was "all about the Security Council." 4 2 At the
same time, however, the loss of ex ante, UNSC control and the U.S. concern
about being the target of politicized prosecutions at the ICC can be viewed as
two sides of the same coin.4 3
This loss of power must also be considered in light of the more or less
concurrent decision to instill the Court's prosecutor with independent, or, in the
words of the Statute, "proprio motu," investigatory powers, 44 in contrast to U.S.
efforts to tightly constrain the prosecutor's authority.4 5 Although a judicial filter
was added to address concerns about inappropriate proprio motu
41. See, e.g., Michael D. Mysak, Judging the Giant: An Examination of American Opposition
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 63 SASK. L. REV. 275, 291 (2000). This
alteration caused one American to speculate that what was really driving the so-called "middle
powers" at Rome was the prospect of "increasing their relative influence by inhibiting and
controlling militarily powerful nations." Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal
Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 101 (2003); see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 26 (3rd ed., 2007) (acknowledging that "the Rome Statute
was an attempt by many states to effect indirectly what could not be done directly, namely, reform of
the United Nations and amendment of [its] Charter").
42. Schabas, Security Council, supra note 17.
43. It bears mentioning that ex ante, UNSC control was also lacking with respect to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the predecessors to the ICC, the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), whose statutes
likewise enabled them to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. nationals on the basis of territorial
jurisdiction. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 36 (May 3, 1993).
Admittedly, the fact that both of these institutions have enjoyed broad U.S. support makes the U.S.
argument with respect to the ICC appear disingenuous. Schabas, Security Council, supra note 17, at
710. Yet it is not clear that this aspect of the Tribunals' jurisdiction was considered at the time of
drafting. David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 1010, 1023 (2008). In fact, after
the ICTY Prosecutor's NATO investigation made it apparent that U.S. nationals were potentially
vulnerable to prosecution at the Tribunals, the statute drafted for the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), which in other respects closely followed that of the ICTY and ICTR. effectively precluded a
similar type of investigation at the SCSL. Luc C6td, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 162, 184 (2005). Moreover, from 2003 onwards, the hands of the
ICTY and ICTR prosecutors have been similarly tied. Completion strategies imposed by the UNSC
have directed the two tribunals to ensure that they only confirm indictments of "the most senior
leaders suspected of being the most responsible for crimes within the[ir respective] jurisdiction[s]."
Id. at 185.
44. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 (1). The decision to expand the triggering of ICC
investigations to include the independent prosecutor's decision to investigate emerged at the last
Preparatory Committee meeting before Rome. Jelena Pejic, The International Criminal Court
Statute. An Appraisal ofthe Rome Package, 34 INT'L LAW. 65, 77 (2000).
45. Pentagon Letter to Military Attaches, Urgent Request for Engagement with Counterparts
on the International Criminal Court, Mar. 31, 1998, in Congressional Research Service Report, supra
note 19 at 31 (informing foreign military attaches that it was the U.S. goal to "preclude the creation
of a so-called proprio motu (independent) prosecutor with unbridled discretion to start
investigations").
2011] 535
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investigations,4 6 U.S. concerns remained and were perhaps intensified by the
prediction that investigations initiated by the prosecutor would be the primary
mechanism by which matters would come before the Court.4 7 The combination
of these factors gave rise to concerns about a worst case scenario in which "a
politically motivated prosecutor might attempt to convict the United States in
the court of public opinion of a violation of international law, by charging one of
its military or civilian officials with war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
genocide, using the accused as a proxy for the United States."4 8
B. The Bush Administration
1. Bush's First Term: Unsigning andAntipathy
Notwithstanding U.S. concerns about the ICC, President Clinton concluded
that signatory status would best position the United States "to influence the
evolution of the Court." 49 The effect of Clinton's signature to the Rome Statute,
however, was relatively short-lived. Rather than utilize this signatory role as
Clinton had intended,50 the Bush administration (in)famously "unsigned" the
Rome Statute approximately a year and a half later, 51 indicative of-and further
46. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 (4). A proprio motu investigation cannot be initiated
without judicial authorization.
47. "The principal argument was that the proposed court would be unlikely to have much work
if it relied upon States Parties and the Security Council to trigger its jurisdiction." SCHABAS, supra
note 41, at 160; see also id. at 143 (noting that referrals made by a state party were considered
unlikely, given the historical reluctance of states to lodge complaints against one another).
48. Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute
of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 129 (2001); see also Giovanni Conso, Are There Hopes of
Reconciliation? The Basic Reasons for US Hostility to the ICC in Light of the Negotiating History of
the Rome Statute, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 314 (2005); Congressional Research Service Report, supra
note 19, at 13 (expressing the concern of some U.S. officials that states with "anti-American
sentiments" might attempt to use the Court to thwart "responsible U.S. military actions on their
territory" or to "subvert U.S. diplomatic efforts"); Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 96-97 (positing that
the two plausible explanations for U.S. concerns about the Court are the remote possibility of the
prosecution of U.S. troops and the sullying of the U.S. international reputation by engaging in an
investigation).
49. Statement by the President, supra note 28.
50. "1 will not, and do not recommend that my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for
advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied." Id.
51. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002),
http://www.1b9.uscourts.gov/webcites/08documents/Abagninin-bolton.pdf The move was likely
precipitated by the 60' ratification of the Statute, made less than one month prior, which ensured
that the ICC would become operational in July 2002. Jean Galbraith, The Bush Administration's
Response to the International Criminal Court, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 683, 687 (2003); see also
Edward T. Swain, Unsigning, 55 STANFORD L. REv. 2061 (2003) (defending the decision to
"unsign"). Sudan has since followed the U.S. lead in this regard, "unsigning" the Statute in August
2008. See Letter from Deng Alor Koul, Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Sudan (Sept.
8, 2008), http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/2008/601_700/612E.pdf. A staunch opponent of the
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engendering-the intensity of U.S. dislike for the International Criminal Court.
This move was arguably predictable, given that President Bush chose John
Bolton as Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security. 52 Prior to
assuming the role, Bolton had publicly espoused his thoughts on the Court,
calling its Statute "pernicious and debilitating."5 3
In the early years of George W. Bush's presidency, Bolton, "the architect
of the government's campaign against the Court,"54 successfully turned existing
U.S. unease with the ICC to flat-out antagonism by seizing upon the fear of
politicized prosecutions and amplifying the importance of distinctions between
U.S. and ICC practices. 55 In addition, Bolton questioned the worth of the
institution, predicting that it would be incapable of contributing to deterrence. 56
Bolton further argued that the ICC Statute inappropriately altered the balance of
authority for the maintenance of international peace and security from the
Security Council to the ICC, leaving U.S. civilian and military leaders
"potentially at risk" and subject to "an unaccountable prosecutor" and
"unchecked judicial power." 57
The Bush administration also aimed to isolate and undermine the Court.58
Court in the face of the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan no doubt wished
to liberate itself from its signatorial obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
52. Bolton's sway over Bush was "greater than his title would ordinarily imply because
[Bolton] was perceived to have helped Bush win the 2000 presidential election." John P. Cerone,
Dynamic Equilibrium. The Evolution of US Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and
Tribunals, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 277, 293 (2007).
53. John R. Bolton, Reject and Oppose the International Criminal Court, in TOWARD AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? THREE OPTIONS PRESENTED AS PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 37, 37
(Alton Frye, ed., 1999) [hereinafter Bolton, Reject and Oppose].
54. Anne K. Handel, The Counterproductive Bush Administration Policy toward the
International Criminal Court, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 345, 364 (2004).
55. At the time, debate on the Court was "define[d] by the Administration ... and counter-
arguments [were] not being heard." Washington Working Group for the ICC, Fact Sheet: US Public
Opinion and the ICC, at 4, October 2003, available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/
WICCUSpublicOp.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
56. "Why should anyone imagine that bewigged judges in The Hague will succeed where cold
steel has failed? Holding out the prospect of ICC deterrence to the weak and vulnerable amounts to a
cruel joke." John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., Remarks to the Federalist
Society: The United States and the International Criminal Court (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
http://news.1p.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dos/dosl I 402wcstmnt.html.
57. Id. (noting further that the attempted marginalization of the Security Council is a
"fundamental new problem created by the ICC that will have a tangible and highly detrimental
impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy").
58. For example, the National Security Strategy announced during George W. Bush's first
term in office provided that: "We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet
our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for
investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction does
not extend to Americans and which we do not accept." John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms
Control and Int'l Sec., Remarks to the Am. Enter. Inst.: American Justice and the International
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Attempts to weaken the ICC's effect included creating so-called "Article 98
agreements," 5 9 bilateral immunity agreements that preclude the consenting state
from surrendering "current or former U.S. government officials, military and
other personnel" to the Court. 60 Moreover, in a strong legislative parallel to the
hostility advanced by the executive branch, Congress adopted the American
Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA). 6 1 Subject to certain delineated
exceptions, the Act prohibits American cooperation with the Court,62 authorizes
the use of "all means necessary" to secure the release of Americans held by or
for the ICC,63 and prohibits military assistance to certain ICC States Parties who
refuse to enter into Article 98 agreements.64
2. Bush's Second Term: A Warming Towards the Court
George W. Bush's second term in office, however, began with decidedly
less antagonism toward the Court. Most notably, the United States decided to
abstain from voting on the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to
Criminal Court (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://stage.amicc.org/docs/Boltonl 1_3_03.pdf
(declaring that the ICC has unacceptable consequences for national sovereignty and describing the
bilateral agreements designed to ensure that other states do not hand over American citizens to the
ICC).
59. Article 98 of the Rome Statute provides that the Court may not proceed with a request for
surrender "which would require the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements[.]" Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2).
60. These agreements were negotiated by the United States with more than 100 countries. The
term "other personnel" includes non-U.S. nationals and therefore includes foreign sub-contractors
working for the United States. Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), Status of US
Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) (2006), available at http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/CICCFS BlAstatus current.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011) (containing a comprehensive
list of the states that signed or ratified such agreements as of 2006).
61. 22 U.S.C. § 7421 et seq. (2002).
62. This is tempered by the "Dodd Amendment," found in Sect. 2015 of the law, which
provides that "[n]othing in this title shall prohibit the United States from rendering assistance to
international efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden,
other members of Al Queda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals accused of
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity."
63. Id. at § 2008. This aspect of the Act earned the ASPA the nickname "The Hague Invasion
Act." See, e.g., 'Hague Invasion Act' Becomes Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 3, 2002),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-act-becomes-law.
64. § 2007 prohibits U.S. military assistance to States Parties to the Rome Statute, but
provides for exceptions when deemed by the President to be in the U.S. national interest, when the
State Party has signed an Article 98 agreement with the United States and with respect to NATO and
non-NATO major allies. That the Act for the most part remains good law lies at odds with the U.S.'s
present engagement with the ICC. See infra section II(C); see also Eight Initiatives the Obama
Administration Should Take on International Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/02/eight-initiatives-obama-administration-should-take-
international-justice ("urg[ing] the Obama administration to signal its opposition to all remaining
provisions of ASPA. This will . . . remove a potential stumbling block for the US to assist the court
in individual investigations").
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the International Criminal Court. 65 In the wake of the strong anti-ICC campaign,
the decision to abstain was unexpected and, perhaps naturally, was perceived to
signal a major change in the U.S.'s relationship with the Court. While there was
certainly support for this perspective; 66 there were likewise indications that the
abstention was hardly the beginning of a truly new era.67 First, at the insistence
of the United States, the UNSC Resolution referring the Darfur situation to the
Court included controversial paragraphs designed to shield U.S. nationals from
prosecution and to preclude the use of UN moneys to finance the relevant
investigations and prosecutions.68 The United States also successfully lobbied
for the inclusion of a preambular reference to Article 98 agreements, an effort
seemingly designed to legitimize the U.S. practice of securing them.6 9 in
65. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); see also Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc SC/8351 (Mar. 31,2005).
66. See, e.g., Press Briefing on Sudan, Robert Zoellick, Deputy Sec'y of State (May 27, 2005)
(asserting that the Security Council referral "send[s] a signal about accountability" and that it's a
useful deterrence [sic] against others").
67. The abstention was accompanied by vows of continuing opposition to the institution. Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, To Prosecutor, U.N.
Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005) (noting that "[a]lthough [the United States] delegation had
abstained on the Council referral to the Court, it had not dropped, and indeed continued to maintain,
its long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the Court.") Moreover, the abstention
was secured only after alternative American efforts had failed. US Fiddles over ICC While Darfur
Burns, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 31, 2005), http:/www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/01/3 1/us-fiddles-
over-icc-while-darfur-bums (noting that the US had attempted to garner support for the creation of a
hybrid tribunal in Africa in lieu of a referral because, per then-U.S. ambassador-at-large for war
crimes, Pierre-Richard Prosper, "We don't want to be a party to legitimizing the ICC.") Further, the
Resolution ensured that jurisdiction over U.S. nationals was effectively precluded by any non-U.S.
court and U.S. Article 98 agreements were acknowledged. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 65, 1 6 and
preamb.
68. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 65, %f 6, 7; see also SCHABAS, supra note 41, at 155-9; Jennifer
K. Elsea, US. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court, Cong. Research Service Report,
Report RL 31495, 25-26 (2006) (updated) (noting that the US abstention might be seen as an
endorsement of the type of court the United States wanted rather than a softening towards the Court
proper). It bears mentioning here that virtually identical provisions to $ 6 & 7 of S.C. Res. 1593 can
be found in the recent Security Council resolution referring the situation in Libya. S.C. Res. 1970,
supra note 4, 6, 8. This suggests that the U.S. decision to lobby for and affirmatively support this
most recent referral may not be as dramatic a turnaround as it otherwise might seem.
69. "The Security Council... Taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article
98-2 of the Rome Statute..." S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 65, preamb. In this respect, consider the
comments made by Brazil's UNSC representative:
The text just approved contains a preambular paragraph through which the
Council takes note of the existence of agreements referred to in article 98-2 of the
Rome Statute. My delegation has difficulty in supporting a reference that not
only does not favour the fight against impunity but also stresses a provision
whose application has been a highly controversial issue.
U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158 mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005); see also The
Remarks of the Danish UNSC Representative. Id. at 6 (maintaining that the reference to Article 98
agreements is "purely factual" and that the resolution evidences a "genuine and valid compromise").
By contrast, S.C. Res. 1970 contains no reference to Article 98 agreements.
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addition, the U.S. abstention was followed by actions taken on behalf of the
administration that were decidedly anti-ICC, such as Bolton's request that all
references to the ICC be deleted from the outcome document of the 2005 World
Summit 70 and the continued pursuit of Article 98 agreements throughout Bush's
second term.71
Moreover, while President Bush's final year in office included noteworthy
support for the prosecutions arising from the situation in Darfur, 72 his
presidency also ended with the conspicuous absence of U.S. participation in the
then-ongoing process of establishing a definition of the crime of aggression, 73
despite the unquestionable importance of this issue to U.S. interests. 74 Perhaps
the U.S. avoided participation because it might have been viewed as an
endorsement of the ICC proper, as opposed to the evidently "pragmatic
exploitation" 75 of the institution with regard to the situation in Darfur. 76 A
sufficiently comprehensive assessment of Bush's second term leads to the
conclusion that the administration's shift on the ICC had more to do with
opportunism and a growing awareness that the Court was not likely to go by the
wayside than it was indicative of a genuine sea change. Indeed, older, more
hostile views77 toward the Court appear to have had a lingering effect, with U.S.
engagement with the Court exercised only infrequently and when all else
70. See, e.g., Paul H. Brietzke, Playing Poker at the U.N., 27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 317, 342
(2007).
71. For example, an Article 98 agreement was secured from Montenegro in 2007, less than
one year after the state came into being. See Letter from U.S. Embassy at Podgorica to Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Montenegro (Apr. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.1l.georgetown.edu/guides/documents/Montenegro07-102.pdf.
72. A seminal example lies in the U.S. decision to abstain on UNSC Res. 1828 because of its
notation that the Security Council "intend[ed] to consider" the request from the African Union that it
defer the ICC case against Sudanese President Al Bashir. S.C. Res. 1828, 9, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1828 (Jul. 31, 2008). For a discussion on this issue, see Annalisa Ciampi, The Proceedings
Against President Omar Al Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension Under Article 16 ICC
Statute, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 885, 887 (2008). For a comprehensive list of acts and statements that
evidence the Bush Administration's support for the Darfur-related prosecutions, see The American
Non-governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Chronology of U.S.
Opposition to the International Criminal Court: From "Signature Suspension" to Immunity
Agreements to Darfur, 3-8 (updated Feb. 12, 2010) available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/
US%20Chronology.pdf
73. On this issue, see infra section III.
74. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Is the United States' Opposition to the ICC Intractable? 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 19, 24 (2004).
75. Cerone, supra note 52, at 304.
76. "By the time the U.S. came under severe pressure to drop its proposal for an ad hoc 'Sudan
Tribunal' to handle what it termed the 'genocide' in Darfir, it was clear that the U.S. hostility
towards the ICC was not achieving it purpose. Far from undermining the ICC, the Bolton-inspired
policies appeared to enhance its credibility." Jose Alvarez, The Evolving U.S.-ICC Relationship, 24
ASIL Newsletter 1 (2008), http://www.asil.org/newsletter/president/pres080320.html.
77. Many of the stronger anti-ICC advocates had by this time left the Administration or lost
their influential roles. Cerone, supra note 52, at 304.
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C. A New Era under Obama
Viewed in this way, Obama advisor Harold Koh was not wrong to note that
under the Obama administration the default on the U.S. relationship with the
Court has been "reset from hostility to positive engagement." 79 Compared to the
so-called warming at the close of the Bush era, it is clear that the United States
has come a long way in improving its relationship with the Court. The Obama
administration announced in its first year that it would review the U.S. policy on
the ICC.80 At the same time, officials in the Obama administration publicly
praised the Court's potential and expressed interest in supporting its
investigations. 8 1
This paved the way for speculation that the new regime would reaffirm
former President Clinton's commitment to the Rome Statute, 82 an idea that was
later bolstered when Secretary of State Clinton conveyed disappointment over
the U.S.'s status as an ICC outsider.83 The United States then participated for
78. Indeed, the individual who served as U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes at the
close of the Bush presidency in 2008 remarked that his office sought first to support the relevant
domestic system, then to explore hybrid tribunal options and [flinally, when other options are not
available, we consider international courts, including the ICC." Clint Williamson, U.S. Efforts to
Combat Genocide and War Crimes, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321, 327 (2008). Williamson
makes the same argument in a separate writing, highlighting the creation of such hybrid courts as the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Clint Williamson, When the
Fighting Stops, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1253, 1262-63 (2008).
79. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't. of State, Special Briefing: U.S.
Engagement With The International Criminal Court and The Outcome Of The Recently Concluded
Review Conference (June 15, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/wcilusreleases/remarks/143 178.htm
(hereinafter U.S. Engagement]; see also Salvatore Zappala, Editorial, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 327,
327 (2010) (noting that "a new mood in the United States, exemplified by the Obama
administration's policy of so-called 'positive engagement' . . . promises to herald in our view a new
era for the ICC").
80. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 12, 2009) (noting also
that the administration supported the work of the Court in relation to the situation in Darfur). These
representations comport with then-candidate Obama's campaign position which signaled the coming
of a new era with regard to the Court. See Citizens for Global Solutions, 2008 Presidential Candidate
Questionnaire, Response from Barack Obama, available at: http://www.globalsolutions.org/
08orbust/pcq/obama (promising cooperation with regard to the situation in Sudan as well a thorough
review to determine whether the US should join the ICC).
81. See LEE FEINSTEIN & TOD LINDBERG, MEANS TO AN END: U.S. INTEREST IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 48 (2009) (containing statements made by Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton and U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Susan Rice).
82. Nicholas Kralev, US Warms to Global Court, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/30/us-warms-to-global-panel/?page=1 (positing
that, while it is likely that the US will affirm its earlier signature, "it may be years before the United
States joins [the] institution").
83. "This is a great regret that we are not a signatory [to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court]. I think we could have worked out some of the challenges that are raised concerning
our membership. But that has not yet come to pass." Ewen MacAskill, Clinton: It is a 'Great Regret'
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the first time as an observer at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the ICC's
Assembly of States Parties (ASP), 84 "the clearest sign [at that time that]
Washington [was] engaging with the Court."8 5 In the wake of that meeting, the
United States began to take additional steps towards forging a relationship with
the ICC, likely hoping to repair its international reputation along the way,86 by
offering to assist with the institution's investigations and prosecutions.
The United States has since announced that it stands ready to protect the
witnesses required to testify against top Kenyan officials at the Court.8 7 The
Obama administration has also proactively sought out meetings with the ICC
prosecutor and other ICC officials in order to determine how the United States
can best help the institution.88 Increased engagement was further demonstrated
by a significant U.S. showing at the ICC Review Conference in Kampala in
mid-2010, 89 President Obama's reprimand of an ICC State Party for its failure
to cooperate with the Court9 0 and, most recently, in the U.S. decision to vote in
the US is Not in International Criminal Court. Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, Signals Shift
by the US in Favour of the International Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/06/us-international-criminal-court; see also Washington
Hints It Might Favor Joining International Court, RADIO FREE EUROPE, Aug. 7, 2009 (observing
that "that the Obama administration already is cooperating with the court in a clear break with
Washington's previous policy of ignoring it").
84. Rapp Speech, supra note 7. The Assembly of States Parties provides management
oversight and is the legislative arm of the Court. It is required to meet annually and may also hold
special sessions. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112.
85. Aaron Gray-Block, U.S. Makes Debut Attendance at Hague War Crimes Court, REUTERS,
Nov. 19, 2009.
86. See, e.g., Elsea, supra note 68, at 29 (noting that cooperating with the ICC "would enhance
the reputation of the United States as a promoter of human rights and the rule of law"). This is
seemingly part of a larger campaign aimed at strengthening U.S. international diplomacy as part of a
strategy for global leadership. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on United
States Foreign Policy (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/09/146917.htm.
87. This offer came before the related ICC investigation was even officially underway. Alan
Boswell, US. to Help Protect Kenyan Violence Witnesses, VOA NEWS, Feb. 11, 2010,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/US-to-Help-Protect-Kenyan-Violence-Witnesses-
84133462.html.
88. Statement by Stephen J. Rapp, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Regarding
Stocktaking at the Eighth Resumed Session of the Assembly of States Parties of the International
Criminal Court (Mar. 23, 2010), http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2OO/l38999.htm. The
need for this assistance is strong. "We have our shopping list ready of requests for assistance . . .
from the American government." Statement of Beatrice Le Fraper Du Hellen, Special Advisor to the
Prosecutor at the ICC, Seeking Global Justice, CNN's Amanpour (Transcript), Mar. 24, 2010,
http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/l003/24/ampr.0l.html. Unsurprisingly, at the top of the list
is a request for U.S. operational support to facilitate the execution of the arrest warrants that have
been issued by the ICC. Id.
89. The U.S. delegation in attendance at the Review Conference included representatives from
the National Security Council, Uniformed Services, and the State, Justice, and Defense Departments.
U.S. Engagement, supra note 79. This showing is a far cry from the "few mid-level career lawyers[]
tasked to engage minimally in the discussions on the crime of aggression" under President Bush in
2001. Scheffer, Staying the Course, supra note 17, at 62
90. Obama "Disappointed" Kenya Hosted Sudan's Bashir, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug.
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favor of referring the situation in Libya to the ICC.91
1. The Influence of Ideology
At first blush, the disparity between the Bush and Obama approaches
toward the Court might appear to have a straightforward explanation. Bush was
an anti-internationalist who surrounded himself, primarily, with anti-
internationalists. 92 Obama, on the other hand, is clearly invested in remedying
America's international reputation, vowing to do what is right "because there is
no force in the world more powerful than the example of America," and
rejecting unilateralism as a non-starter.93 President Obama has appointed
individuals who stand ready to support his agenda accordingly 94and who
proudly distinguish this administration from the last "with respect to its
approach and attitude toward international law." 95
It would be a mistake, however, to put the change in U.S. tenor toward the
Court down to ideology alone. 96 One must also bear in mind that the Obama
administration came into power with two advantages over the Bush
administration: the benefit of hindsight and the absence of any negative history
with the Court. Owing to the former, the Obama administration is in a better
position to assess existing U.S. reservations about the Court in light of the ICC's
ongoing work than its predecessor was.
27, 2010, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gBZwsGDmXZU-
zu4szjFinzqkKVWg.
91. See supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Cerone, supra note 52, at 304; see also Philippe Sands, Lawless World: The
Cultures ofInternational Law, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 387, 392 (2006).
93. "[W]e are showing the world that a new era of engagement has begun. For we know that
America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without
America." Barack Obama, President, U.S., Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press-office/remarks-of-president-barack-obama-address-to-joint-
session-of-congress (concluding that "in our hands lies the ability to shape our world for good or for
ill").
94. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The U.S. Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 43 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003);
see also: Transcript, Obama's National Security Team Announcement, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/us/politics/ltext-obama.html (including then President-elect
Obama's comment that the members of the team he assembled "share [his] pragmatism about the use
of power and [his] sense of purpose about America's role as a leader in the world" and relevant
remarks from Hillary Clinton, such as "America cannot solve . . . crises without the world, and the
world cannot solve them without America.").
95. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, The Obama Administration
and International Law, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25,
2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
96. This conclusion comports with the findings of a recent assessment of U.S. attitudes
towards International Criminal Courts and Tribunals. U.S. support generally turns on such issues as
Security Council control, a preference for domestic prosecutions and a commitment to
accountability; the "ideological leanings of those in power" may have an impact, but one that tends
to be "moderated over time." Cerone, supra note 52, at 314.
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2. ICC Investigations and Sovereignty Concerns
Significantly, a survey of the early work of the ICC does not bear out the
concern that the United States-or indeed any state-is apt to be unfairly
targeted by the Court. In fact, at the start of the Obama administration, the only
situation under consideration at the ICC that was fraught with Court-state
tension was that of Darfur, brought within the jurisdiction of the Court by the
earlier mentioned Security Council referral.9 7 Remarkably, the "dangerous"
proprio motu investigatory powers of the ICC prosecutor were never used prior
to Obama taking office. They have since been used only one time with, at least
initially, apparent state support 98 in the situation in the Republic of Kenya. 99
Interestingly, the remainder of the ICC's investigations and cases has come
before the Court in a way that had not been previously anticipated: the triggering
97. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 65 and accompanying text. Although subject to still
unfolding developments, it may well be that the most recent Security Council referral will similarly
engender hostility from the territorial state. Whether Libya will ultimately oppose ICC investigations
and prosecutions appears to depend upon the identity of its future government, a matter of some
uncertainty as the article goes to press. Alan Greenblatt, Leaders of the Libyan Opposition Emerge,
NPR, Mar. 14, 2011. The ICC investigation presently focuses on Muammar al Gadaffi and his inner
circle. Statement of the Prosecutor on the Opening of the Investigation into the Situation in Libya
(Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/035C3801-5C8D-4ABC-876B-
C7D946B51F22/283045/StatementLibya_ 0303201 1.pdf The ongoing conflict in Libya appears to
have prevented any official response to the referral, but it seems fair to surmise that the consequent
ICC investigation will be opposed by the Gadaffi regime if it remains in power.
98. "Kenya itself mooted the possibility of ICC investigations for the violence, although it was
ultimately taken up by the Prosecutor on his own accord after delays on the part of Kenyan
authorities to take appropriate action against those suspected of the violence." Max du Plessis, The
African Union, the International Criminal Court and al-Bashir's Visit to Kenya, INST. FOR SEC.
STUDIES (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today.php?ID=1025. Both political sides in
Kenya later expressed willingness to cooperate with the ICC. Prosecutor Seeks Ok on Kenya
Inquiry, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11/26/icc-
prosecutor-seeks-ok-kenya-inquiry. The official position of the Kenyan government has recently
changed, however, with its filing of the first ever state challenge to the admissibility of an ICC case.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case Nos. ICC-01/09-01/l1 and ICC 01/09-02/11, Application
on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl050005.pdf.
99. In the wake of post-election violence in Kenya, a Commission of Inquiry was formed. As a
result of its investigation, a list of alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity was ultimately
handed over to the ICC prosecutor. Antonina Okuta, National Legislation for the Prosecution of
International Crimes in Kenya, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1063, 1064-65 (2009). After the government's
failure to establish a domestic criminal tribunal to prosecute the relevant crimes, presumably owing
to internal division, the ICC Prosecutor requested that the Pre-trial Chamber authorize his
investigation into the matter. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation
in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.ice-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf An
outright self-referral of the situation was not feasible as it "would have been a de facto admission
that Kenya is unable to prosecute the perpetrators, and that would have put [it] under the umbrella of
failed states." Nick Wadhams, After Kenyan Stalling, the ICC Will Investigate Post-Election Riots,
TIME, Nov. 6, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,1935921,00.html
(quoting Hassan Omar Hassan, head of the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights).
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of ICC jurisdiction by way of "voluntary referrals,"100 in which member states
have asked the prosecutor to investigate situations involving rebel bands within
their borders.10 1 The first such referral came from Uganda in late 2003.102
Uganda's decision to refer a situation that took place on its own territory appears
to have opened the door to the second voluntary referral, rendered by the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) some months later, in relation to killings
in its Ituri region. 10 3 The following year, the Central African Republic followed
suit. 104 At this point, it is logical to consider why half of the investigations
undertaken at the ICC have been initiated through an unanticipated channel.
a. The Practice of the Prosecutor
Shortly after assuming office in 2003, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC's
first prosecutor, noted the challenges he would face in putting together a case as
an "outsider" to a conflict, recognizing that investigations would not be easy to
conduct and that state support would be an imperative factor to achieving
success. 105 In making this prediction, Moreno-Ocampo no doubt considered the
hardships encountered by his counterparts at the two predecessors to the ICC,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)10 6 and the
100. "[T]here had never been even the slightest suggestion in the drafting history of the [Rome]
Statute that a State might refer a case 'against itself. . . ."' William A. Schabas, 'Complementarity in
Practice': Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L. F. 5,7 (2008) [hereinafter Schabas,
Complementarity].
101. SCHABAS, supra note 41, at 36. See also Claus Kress, Self-Referrals and Waivers of
Complementarity: Some Considerations in Law and Policy, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 944 (2004).
102. Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First
State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 403 (2005).
103. Prior to the referral, the situation had captured the interest of the Prosecutor. "In
September 2003 the Prosecutor informed the States Parties that he was ready to request authorization
from the Pre-Trial Chamber to use his own powers to start an investigation [into the situation in the
DRC], but that a referral and active support from the DRC would assist his work." Press Release,
ICC, Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens First Investigation, ICC
Doc. ICC-OTP-20040623-59 (June 23, 2004); see also SCHABAS, supra note 41, at 42; Akhavan,
supra note 102, at 405-406.
104. Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic,
ICC Doc. ICC-OTP-20050107-86 (Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0105/Central+African+Republic.htm. More than
two years passed before the Prosecutor opened an investigation. Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor
Opens Investigation in the Central African Republic, ICC Doc. ICC-OTP-20070522-220 (May 22,
2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20medialpress%20releases/
2007/prosecutor%2opens%20investigation%20in%20the%20central%20african%20republic?lan=e
n-GB. The delay between referral and investigation was the result of the Prosecutor's decision to
monitor the development of referring country's justice system. SCHABAS, supra note41, at 52.
105. International Criminal Court, Paper On Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the
Prosecutor 2 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo, 2003 Paper], http://www.icc-
cpi.intfNR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905 Policy
Paper.pdf.
106. Established under the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).'o 7 Like Moreno-Ocampo,
ICTY and ICTR prosecutors have had to rely on the cooperation of states and
state-like entities in order to perform their investigative and prosecutorial
functions. In practice, this has frequently meant an uphill battle, in which
prosecutors have struggled in their efforts to investigate crimes in hostile
environments, effectuate the arrest of indicted persons, and obtain evidence from
obstructive states. 108
As a result, an annex to a 2003 paper penned by Moreno-Ocampo
anticipated the possibility of either minimizing or circumventing these
difficulties. After introducing the novel concept of a voluntary referral, a referral
by a state of a situation on its territory, Moreno-Ocampo shared the view that, in
such cases,
the Prosecutor has the advantage of knowing that that State has the political will
to provide his Office with all the cooperation within the country that it is required
to give under the Statute. Because the State, of its own volition, has requested the
exercise of the Court's jurisdiction, the Prosecutor can be confident that the
national authorities will assist the investigation, will accord the privileges and
immunities necessary for the investigation, and will be anxious to provide if
possible and appropriate the necessary level of protection to investigators and
witnesses. 109
Moreno-Ocampo later revisited this issue in 2006, by which time his vision
was becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Court's docket in its entirety then
consisted of three so-called "self-referrals," arising from situations in Uganda
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with a like referral by the Central
African Republic awaiting prosecutorial authorization, and one lone Security
Council referral regarding the situation in Darfur. Moreno-Ocampo's three years
as prosecutor confirmed the numerous impediments he anticipated, causing him
to cite as "exceptional logistical difficulties" safety issues, on-going violence,
language barriers and inaccessibility to certain territories.1 10 At the same time,
he opined that "[t]he method of initiating investigations by voluntary referral has
increased the likelihood of important cooperation and on-the-ground
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993).
107. Established under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
108. See generally Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with
Primitive Tools: Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal
Proceedings, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 403 (2004); see also James A. Goldston, More Candour about
Criteria, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 383, 396 (2010) (noting that "the reality is that the ICC Prosecutor is
substantially more dependent on state cooperation than his ICTY and ICTR counterparts").
109. International Criminal Court, Annex to the "Paper on some policy issues before the Office
of the Prosecutor": Referrals and Communications 5 (2004), http://www.icc-
cpi.int1NR/rdonlyres/278614ED-A8CA-4835-B91D-DB7FA7639E02/143706/policyannexfinal_
210404.pdf.
110. The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three
Years (June 2003 - June 2006) 7-8, (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport2006O9l4_English.pdf.
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support."I 11
The prosecutorial benefit to proceeding in this manner is apparent when
compared with Moreno-Ocampo's work in relation to Darfur, the one matter in
which the prosecutor was then definitively, and not by his own choosing,
operating at odds with the territorial state. At the same time that the prosecutor
enjoyed the advantages inherent to the "voluntary referrals" made by Uganda,
the DRC, and the Central African Republic,11 2 he was initially unable to get his
Sudan investigation off of the ground. This seems to have been attributable to a
lack of state cooperation and to Moreno-Ocampo's inability to successfully
move forward without it. 113 Drawing in particular on the experience of the
ICTY, what lies ahead with respect to the Darfur referral is no doubt a
Herculean task, requiring "patience and cunning . . . as well as innovative tactics
and strategy." 11 4 As such, a comparison with the Darfur situation perhaps best
illustrates the attraction of proceeding with the tacit promise of state cooperation
that comes by way of self-referral.
In addition to reaping these noted investigatory rewards, there is arguably a
significant supplementary impetus for the prosecutor's decision to court
voluntary referrals. In light of the U.S.'s long-standing opposition to the
prosecutor's independent powers, it may well have seemed shrewd to avoid
utilizing them. 115 Considered alongside the prosecutor's determination to avoid
publicly shaming states by privately rejecting inappropriate referrals,1 16
avoiding the proprio motu option appears likely to have been part of a larger
design to quell concerns about his independent authority.' 17
111. Id. at7.
112. See infra section 11 (C) (2).
113. Even strong supporters of the Court remarked upon the Prosecutor's failure to take the
steps necessary to secure the Security Council's assistance. See Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still
Having Teething Problems?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 434, 439 (2006) (noting, in addition, Moreno-
Ocampo's missed opportunity in dramatizing the conflict so as to garner attention and support).
Some three years after the Security Council referral, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch
lamented Moreno-Ocampo's failure to employ creative ways of acquiring information, noting that,
instead, the Prosecutor "banked on the idea that if he [was] sufficiently nice to Khartoum, he [could]
perhaps trick the government into cooperating--get it to turn over a key piece of evidence--but that
has not worked." Comments of Kenneth Roth, The International Criminal Court Five Years on:
Progress or Stagnation? 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 763, 768 (2008).
114. David Tolbert, International Criminal Law: Past and Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1281,
1290 (2009).
115. "[T]the prosecutor has demonstrated a clear sense of focus on the perceived legitimacy of
his investigations." Tod Lindberg, A Way Forward with the International Criminal Court, POL'Y
REv., Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5369. See also Conso,
supra note 48, at 322; SCHABAS, supra note 41, at 165.
116. Lindberg, supra note 115.
117. See Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of "Self-Referrals" a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 949, 950 (2004):
It is possible that the Prosecutor's [solicitation of a voluntary referral by the
DRC] is aimed at reassuring opponents of the Court who fear that he may wield
his investigative powers too boldly: the Prosecutor could have started the
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In this respect, one cannot likely overstate the effect that the prosecutor's
chosen docket to date has had upon the Obama administration's perception of
the Court. As was rightly predicted, "[s]election of early cases by the Prosecutor
and Pretrial Chamber [has proved to] be a critical test."l 18 According to U.S.
Ambassador Rapp, "We've had a concern in the past that the ICC could ...
undertake politically motivated prosecutions, could perhaps come after
Americans who were engaged in protecting people from atrocity instead of
emphasizing those that were committing the crimes. Thus far, the Court has
been appropriately focused."' 1 9
Of course, the Bush administration also had the opportunity to appreciate
the "appropriate focus" of the Court; by mid-way through Bush's second term in
office, the ICC's docket consisted solely of voluntary referrals and the situation
in Darfur. 120 The Bush administration's comfort level with the Court should
therefore have been bolstered by the fact that the ICC had then yet to assert
jurisdiction over the objection of any state aside from Sudan, as well as the fact
that every matter before the ICC "dovetail[ed] with US foreign policy
interests."1 21 This situation likely made the Bush administration's ultimately
less hostile approach toward the Court possible. However, at that point it seems
the relationship was too far gone for the administration to engage extensively
with the ICC.122 To do more than selectively utilize ICC activity to its own
advantage would have required not only an implicit admission that its vibrant
anti-ICC campaign was unsuccessful and off the mark, but also tacit recognition
of the Court's staying power and potential.
investigation in the DRC on his own initiative, but he pushed for, and gained, a
self-referral. Thus, the Court has made its first steps in the guise of an institution
that can assist states to obtain justice in the face of mass atrocities committed
within their boundaries, rather than as an interfering international watchdog
against which states have to defend themselves.
See also MOHAMED EL ZEIDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE 235 (2008).
118. Wald, supra note 74, at 22. In fact, Wald notes that it might be particularly useful for the
prosecutor to employ a strategy of targeting cases that do not involve US national or residents but in
which "the United States has a clear interest in seeing the perpetrators brought to justice." Id. at 23.
119. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Rapp. Rapp later re-emphasized the
importance of case selection by noting its importance to acquiring any type of U.S. support: "at least
in the situations that have been opened so far, we're prepared to do what we can to assist those
prosecutions . . . ." Id.
120. See infra section 11 (C) (2).
121. Cerone, supra note 52, at 304. On the situation in Uganda, see, e.g., Statement by the
President on the Signing of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda
Recovery Act of 2009 (May 24, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-
president-signing-lords-resistance-army-disarmament-and-northern-uganda-r.
122. Cerone, for example, speculates that the anti-ICC rhetoric espoused in the latter part of the
Bush Administration may have been a "smokescreen" designed to veil its change in position.
Cerone, supra note 52, at 305 n.168.
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3. Additional Reasons
The Obama administration also enjoys an enhanced ability to observe the
Court in action over that of its predecessor.123 Indeed, it was not until the end of
the Bush presidency that certain U.S. concerns, such as those regarding the
ICC's ability to ensure a fair trial, 124 had even the prospect of being genuinely
abated.125 In June 2008, despite widespread criticism regarding the ICC's ability
to get up and running, 126 Trial Chamber I made the remarkable decision to stay
the Lubanga case because of due process concerns. 127 Placing the integrity of
the proceedings ahead of the pressure to show results, the decision halted the
case just a few days shy of its highly anticipated commencement as the Court's
first trial. The upside of this delay is the positive perception it created; namely,
that the ICC judiciary stands ready to ensure a fair trial at any cost,128 a state of
123. The ICC's first trial did not officially start until 2009. Press Release, ICC, Opening of the
First Trial of the Court on Monday 26 January 2009: For the First time in the History of International
law the Victims will Fully Participate in the Proceedings, ICC Doc. ICC-OTP-20090123-PR388
(Jan. 23, 2009).
124. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Courts: A Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA.
J. INT'L L. 319, 345 (noting that U.S. opponents occasionally allege that the due process protections
embodied in the Rome Statute are inadequate in comparison to those employed by the United
States). Despite this, "[s]cholars and commentators have long recognized that fundamental due
process rights are protected by the Rome Statute." Scheffer & Cox, supra note 43, at 1048.
125. "In terms of procedure, every lawyer knows how difficult, if not dangerous, it is to speak
about law without practice." Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court
in Outline: Anatomy ofa Unique Compromise, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 603, 603 (2003).
126. "Like all too many international bodies, the ICC moves at a molasses pace .... ICC
prosecution efforts to date have been criticized for taking too much time to accomplish very little."
Adam Hochschild, The Trial of Thomas Lubanga, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2009; see also Vijay
Padmanabhan, From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the 2010 International Criminal
Court Review Conference, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report 55 (Apr. 2010),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21934/fromrome-to-kampala.html; Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The
ICC in Trouble, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 409 (2008) (concluding that the record-breaking length of the
Lubanga pre-trial phase makes the oft considered glacial pace of ICTY prosecutions appear efficient
by comparison).
127. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements
and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together With Certain Other Issues
Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008 (June 13, 2008).
128. ICC proponents predicted that the initial stay in the Lubanga proceedings would help to
dissipate US concerns about the fairness of Court procedures. Dennis Doyle, ICC Halts Lubanga
Trial, USA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (June 18, 2008),
http://usaforicc.wordpress.com/2008/06/18/icc-halts-lubanga-trial/; see also Rachel Katzman, The
Non-Disclosure of Potentially Exculpatory Evidence and the Lubanga Proceedings: How the ICC
Defense System Affects the Accused's Right to a Fair Trial, 8 NW J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 77, 78 (2009)
(averring that "[t]he stay of proceedings was a strong assertion by the Chamber that the rights of the
accused are paramount"). The Trial Chamber has continued to evidence this commitment. It later
stayed the Lubanga proceedings yet again owing to fair trial concerns. Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request
for Variation of the Time Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay
the Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, 2 (July 8, 2010). The stay remained
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affairs that certainly makes U.S. support of the ICC both more likely and more
tenable. 129
What's more, contrary to John Bolton's predictions, since mid-2008,
evidence has surfaced that indicates that the work of the ICC is actually having a
deterrent effect. 130 Ever since Thomas Lubanga has been on trial in The Hague
for "enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years . . . and
using them to actively participate in hostilities"1 3 1 in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, "few child soldiers have been seen [in that country]." 1 32 In fact, the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed
Conflict recently testified that the ICC's willingness to prosecute individuals
who utilize child soldiers has had an appreciable effect throughout the world,
causing "many armed groups" to approach U.N. entities in order "to negotiate
action plans for the release of children."1 33
4. Summary
It is therefore against this backdrop that the present U.S. approach to the
Court emerged. In the wake of carefully selected investigations whose pursuit
in place for some three months, until the source of the problem was resolved. Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request
for Variation of the Time Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay
the Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU" (Oct. 8, 2010).
129. "The American government might ... become more supportive of the Court if political
observers witnessed growing sensitivity to the rights and interests of the accused. The more the ICC
becomes like a real criminal court, operating under the rule of law, the more American politicians
are likely to shelve their fears of politicized prosecution." George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin,
Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
539, 561 (2005); see also Wald, supra note 74, at 23.
130. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT'S FIRST YEARS 64, 68-69 (July 11, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/
2008/07/10/courting-history-0; see also Thadeus Mabasi, ICC Arrest Warrants No Impediment to
Peace, NEW VISION, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/459/646751.
131. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Public Redacted
Version with Annex 1, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 156-157 (Jan. 29, 2007).
132. Hochschild, supra note 126 (concluding that "if the various rebel groups still fighting have
[child soldiers], they are at least being kept well out of sight when journalists, ICC investigators, or
UN observers are about"). A key aspect to the deterrent effect lies simply in the fact that the charges
have educated the public, informing it that the use of child soldiers is in fact a crime. Human Rights
Watch, supra note 130, at 69; see also id. at 127 (noting that "many people in Ituri did not view the
use of child soldiers as being illegal or a particularly serious crime").
133. Testimony of Radhika Coomaraswamy, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06 Transcript of Jan. 7, 2010, at 16. Cf Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International
Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 777, 807
(2006) (arguing that, because international prosecutions are less certain and threaten less punishment
than their domestic counterparts, they are not likely to contribute to deterrence). There is, however, a
downside to the external effect of the Court's work; it appears that some children are now hidden or
abandoned rather than demobilized owing to the fear of prosecution. Human Rights Watch, supra
note 130, at 69-70.
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did not affront the relevant states, indications of Court sensitivity to ensuring
due process, and signs of a deterrent effect on the ground, there could likely be
no better time for the United States to re-engage with the ICC. Moreover, there
was a compelling, additional impetus for the Obama administration to be pro-
active about the Court. As the first ever opportunity to amend the Court's
statute1 34 loomed, so did a possible resolution of the crime of aggression, the
only crime within the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction for which an agreed upon
definition proved elusive in Rome. 13 5 Renewed U.S. involvement with the
Court, in particular its participation in the 2010 Kampala Review Conference,
could therefore contribute to the discussions on the ever important issue of
aggression and might possibly affect whether and how the Court would be able
to deal with the crime.
III.
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
For more than a decade prior to the Review Conference, the United States
had been uneasy about the ICC's ability to exercise jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression. At the Rome Conference in 1998, the crime of aggression was
one of the key factors creating doubts for the U.S. delegation and policy-makers
over the emerging ICC statute. Once defined, the adopted language had the
potential to "redefine or modify the concept and conduct of warfare." 1 36 An
agreed upon definition might therefore alter the manner in which the United
States could comfortably employ its global military power. 137 In addition, if the
Court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over alleged violations mirrored that of its
power in relation to the other crimes that make up the ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction, 13 8 it would effectively dilute the Security Council's existing
monopoly over determining acts of aggression. 139 As a result, the vulnerability
134. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121 (1) (dictating that no amendment to the Statute can be
made until the Statute had been in force for seven years).
135. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(2); see, e.g., Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson,
Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, 79, 85 in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTS (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999)
(describing the politicized conflicts among states that prevented agreement as to a definition); Noah
Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161, 170-71 (2008).
136. Congressional Research Service Report, supra note 19, at 16 n.61.
137. Indeed, even the prospect of the crime played a role in the United Kingdom's
consideration of participation in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Weisbord, supra note 135, at
170-71.
138. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
139. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
U.N. Charter, art. 39; see, e.g., Mark S. Stein, The Security Council, the International Criminal
Court and the Crime of Aggression: How Exclusive is the Security Council's Power to Determine
Aggression? 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 31 (2005) (arguing that the proper interpretation of
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of U.S. political and military leaders to prosecution would be widened, 140 as
would the possibility of initiating an investigation that might tarnish the
reputation of the United States. 14 1
Given these issues, it is of little surprise that the agenda of the American
delegations present at the ASP meeting in November 2009, where the States
Parties decided the potential amendments later to be considered in
Kampala,142and the subsequent Review Conference in June 2010 were clearly
connected to the unresolved issues regarding the crime of aggression. 143
this provision is that "no body other than the Security Council may determine aggression for the
Security Council.. . .")
140. In some respects, this was not a negligible concern. Indeed, prior to the creation of a
generally agreed upon definition of the crime, there was no shortage of individuals who voiced the
opinion that the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was an act of aggression. See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra
note 41, at 218 (noting that the crime "is well recognized in customary international law"); Ronald
C. Kramer & Raymond Michaelowski, War Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis
of the Invasion and Occupation oflraq, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 446, 446 (2005). Prominent U.K.
legal figures have since testified in hearings held in relation to the country's Iraq Inquiry that
Operation Iraqi Freedom amounted to the crime of aggression and was known to be so at the time of
the invasion. See, e.g., Richard Norton-Taylor, Blair's Case for Iraq Invasion Was Self-Serving,
Lawyers Tell Chilcot Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 1, 2010, at 20. But see U.S. Engagement, supra
note 79, (Comments of Koh maintaining that "Of course, [the United States does] not commit
aggression. .. .").
141. "[E]ven if no U.S. official ends up in The Hague, the ICC can affect the United States by
merely investigating alleged crimes and engaging in official public criticism and judgment of U.S.
military actions." Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 97.
142. Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.6, Review Conference, Annexes II and 111, ASP 8" Plenary
Mtg., ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20 (Nov. 26, 2009) [hereinafter ICC Resolution on the Review
Conference]. The only other amendment proposal, addressing the supplementation of the list of
prohibited weapons cited in the existing definition of war crimes, was far less controversial and drew
considerably less attention. Id. The possible deletion of Article 124, which allows a new State Party
to deny the Court's jurisdiction for up to seven years in regards to war crimes, was also up for
consideration in Kampala. Its review was statutorily dictated. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
Despite NGO opposition to the provision, it remains in place. Chandra Lekha Sriram, ICC Hypocrisy
Over War Crimes: Amnesty Has Called Article 124 of the Rome Statute a 'Licence to Kill', But
Despite Support for its Deletion the Big Powers Won Out, THE GUARDIAN, June 22, 2010, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/22/icc-hypocrisy-article-124-war-crimes.
143. Rapp Speech, supra note 7 (remarking that, while the U.S. primarily intended to "listen
and learn" at the November ASP meeting, the ambassador "would be remiss not to share" the U.S.
concerns regarding the crime of aggression, including the U.S. position that "jurisdiction should
[only] follow a Security Council determination that aggression has occurred"); see also Mike
Corder, Not a Member, US Envoy Attends International Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010306874_apeuinternational
courtus.html (attributing the US presence at the November ASP meeting to the fact that
"Washington wants a role in drafting a definition of the crime of aggression for inclusion in the
court's statute(]"). While American players were less forthcoming about the connection between
their presence in Kampala and the crime of aggression, the U.S.'s strong interest in affecting the
aggression discussion in Kampala was hardly a secret. See Afua Hirsch, New Face at the
International Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN, May 30, 2010, at 12. The U.S. participation in
Kampala provides further evidence of the delegation's aggression-oriented focus See also William
A. Schabas, Kampala Diary 4/6/10, THE ICC REV. CoNF.: KAMPALA 2010 (June 5, 2010, 10:28
PM), http://iccreviewconference.blogspot.com/2010/06/kampala-diary-4610.html (describing US
Legal Advisor Harold Koh's speech in Kampala as including "a very extensive list of arguments in
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A. The Definition
The primary U.S. objective for the Review Conference was to avoid
agreement on a definition of aggression. 144 Failing that, its aim was to alter the
definition that had been finessed-without U.S. input-in the years leading up
to Kampala. 145 Had the United States prevailed in its chief objective, the above
noted concerns would have been delayed, if not averted. It also would have
postponed the need to confront some additional issues inherent in the nature of
the crime.
As the crime of aggression by its very nature implicates the related state, 146
it is particularly susceptible to use as a tool by which political battles might be
waged through the forum of the ICC, an oft-noted U.S. concern. 14 7 Moreover, as
the following discussion establishes, this aspect of the crime might be seen as
one that renders it incompatible with the relevant state's ability to avail itself of
the principle of complementarity.
Leaving concerns about a rogue prosecutor and a runaway judiciary
aside, 14 8 the Court's principle of complementarity makes it feasible for any
state, regardless of its membership status, to preclude the ICC from exercising
jurisdiction over its nationals. In this respect, the principle of complementarity
dictates that a genuine domestic investigation and a subsequent prosecution, if
necessary, will serve to bar the matter from ever becoming a part of the Court's
docket. 149 Consider, however, that a state's ability to institute internal
prosecutions must realistically turn in part on the fact that the alleged crimes can
be portrayed as aberrant acts of an individual or set of individuals-even if the
person(s) charged enjoyed a leadership position-from which the prosecuting
state can distance itself. Not so the crime of aggression, which wholly implicates
the relevant state.150 In such cases, the state would essentially have to put itself
favour of deferring any discussion of aggression," such as a "lack of consensus," "the need for
clarity in the definition," and "many other difficulties").
144. Conversation with Jennifer Trahan, Chair, American Branch, International Law
Association, ICC Committee; Assistant Professor of Global Affairs, N.Y.U. (April 11, 2011).
145. See id.; see also Jennifer Trahan, The Rome Statute's Amendment on the Crime of
Aggression: Negotiations at the Kampala Review Conference, 11 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 73 (2011).
146. Consider, for example, the definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly
in 1974, which provides in pertinent part: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a state ..... UN
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 23 19 'h plenary mtg., Dec. 14, 1974. The General Assembly definition was
ultimately incorporated into the definition adopted in Kampala. Amendments to the Rome Statute,
supra note 21, art. 8 bis (2).
147. Congressional Research Service Report, supra note 19, at 13 (expressing the concern of
some U.S. officials that states with "anti-American sentiments," might attempt to use the Court to
thwart "responsible U.S. military actions on their territory" or to "subvert U.S. diplomatic efforts").
148. See, e.g., Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction
Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 66
(2001).
149. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 (1)(a), (b).
150. "[T]he crime of aggression [] remains most profoundly a 'crime of state."' SCHABAS,
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on trial in order to preclude an ICC investigation or prosecution, an unlikely
possibility even when there has been a subsequent change in power. 15 1
The state condemnation facet is evident in the definition of aggression that
was ultimately adopted in Kampala, which provides in relevant part:
(1) For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State,
of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes
a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed
force by a State against the Sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State. ... 152
The American delegation was clearly dissatisfied with this definition. 153
Despite U.S. success in shaping the manner in which the Court's newest crime
will be interpreted and applied through the creation of "understandings,"l 54 the
ICC definition of the crime of aggression has been described by the chief U.S.
Legal Advisor as "flawed" and has been criticized by the present Ambassador-
at-Large for War Crimes for being too vague. 155 In this respect, the general
sentiment expressed by the American delegation seems rather the fulfillment of
former Ambassador David Scheffer's prediction in the early days of the Bush
administration. 156 The rest of the world, through a Special Working Group on
supra note 41, at 139.
151. While there might be a political impetus post-regime change to implicate the prior
administration in an internal aggression prosecution, this action may create problems for the newly
empowered administration, such as providing a basis for a subsequent action in which reparations
may be sought. "It is well established in general international law that a State which bears
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full reparation for
the injury caused by that act." Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. No. 116, 259 (Dec. 2006), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/l 16/10455.pdf (finding that Uganda caused injury to the DRC and requiring
Uganda to make reparations). Moreover, in order for the United States to institute such proceedings,
the crime of aggression would have to be incorporated into U.S. law, an unlikely possibility for the
foreseeable future. Padmanabhan, supra note 126, at 17.
152. Amendments to the Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 8 bis (1) and 8 bis (2) (emphasis
added).
153. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Koh and Rapp.
154. Understandings regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.4, Annex III. The concept of
adopting understandings at Kampala that would ultimately serve to facilitate the application of the
aggression amendments was introduced by the United States. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79,
Comments of Rapp. Seven such understandings were ultimately adopted, with understandings four
through seven employing verbatim or near verbatim language to that which was included in the
initial U.S. proposal. U.S. Understandings, First Proposal (Jun. 6, 2010) (on file with author). Only
time will tell the true effect of these provisions which, unlike the Elements of Crimes, are not
provided for in the Rome Statute. At a bare minimum, should the ICC judges need to discern the
drafters' intent when applying the aggression amendments, the understandings will prove of
significant assistance.
155. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Koh and Rapp.
156. Ambassador David J. Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective on the International Criminal
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the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA),' 57 had spent nearly a decade working on a
suitable definition for the crime without U.S. input. 158 Years of work on the part
of the SWGCA caused certain aspects of the aggression definition to become
entrenched over time and, because of the U.S. absence in this process, the result
for the Obama administration was that "some things ended up in [the drafting]
process that. . . probably wouldn't have been there if [the United States had]
been involved." 1 59
B. The Court's Ability to Exercise Its Jurisdiction over the Crime
Yet whether these perceived definitional shortcomings create a
fundamental problem for the United States remains to be seen. The pivotal issue
is, of course, the Court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression in the first place.160 In this regard, it is first worth noting that it will
be a number of years before the crime can be investigated or prosecuted at the
ICC.16 1 Of greater import to the United States, however, is the fact that the
Kampala amendments make the possibility of one of its nationals being
prosecuted for aggression at the ICC beyond unlikely.162 This is true despite the
Court, 167 MIL. L. REv. 1, 14 (2001) (predicting that "the rest of the world will not be impressed"
with Bush's policy of very limited engagement with the Court and that it "will soldier on drafting
documents of central importance to the operation of the Court").
157. The SWGCA was established by the ASP after the Rome Statute came into effect in July
2002. Troy Lavers, (Pre)Determining the Crime of Aggression: Has the Time Come to Allow the
International Criminal Court Its Freedom?, 71 ALB. L. REv. 299, 302 (2008).
158. "[Alfter 'unsigning' the Rome Statute on May 6, 2002, the United States did not
participate in the discussions of the SWGCA." Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of
Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 71, 112 (2010).
159. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Rapp (concluding that, in Kampala, the
U.S. delegation "had to play catch-up with that.").
160. Fittingly, "the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, as was well
appreciated long before we all came to Kampala, proved to be the far more politically controversial
and diplomatically vexed issue to resolve." Robbie Manson, Smoothing Out the Rough Edges on the
Kampala Compromise, INST. L. ACCOUNTABLITY & PEACE, at 1 (June 18, 2010),
http://blogs.ubc.calligilfiles/2010/06/Post-Kampala-Articlemanson.pdf.
161. The recent amendments delay the start of the Court's jurisdiction over the crime until at
least Jan. 1, 2017. They also require that an additional vote then be taken, and that thirty states have
ratified the aggression amendments for a period of one year, before the crime can be activated.
Amendments to the Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 15 bis (2) and (3); art. 15 ter (2) and (3). No
one appears to doubt that these statutory hurdles will be overcome. See e.g. David Scheffer,
Adoption of the Amendments on Aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
ASIL BLOG- INT'L CRIM. CT. REV. CONF. (June 13, 2010), http://iccreview.asil.org/ (remarking that
he "would be surprised if, by January 1, 2017, the 30-State Party requirement will not have been
met").
162. U.S. Legal Advisor Harold Koh's conclusion was, at least initially, slightly more
conservative. Koh surmised that "the chances are extremely remote that a prosecution [of the crime
of aggression] will, at some point in the distant future, affect [the U.S.] negatively." U.S.
Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Koh. One day later, however, Koh declared that the
Kampala amendments "ensure total protection for U.S. armed forces and other nationals going
forward." Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, The U.S. and the
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fact that the United States again did not achieve its primary objective pertaining
to the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime. Joined by the four other permanent
members of the Security Council, 163 the United States sought to condition the
Court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over alleged acts of aggression on a
Security Council referral. 164
Instead, the role of the Security Council vis-A-vis the ICC's exercise of its
aggression jurisdiction is far more limited. As with other crimes in the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction, the Security Council may refer relevant situations to
the ICC; 16 5 it may also call a halt to an aggression investigation or prosecution
for one year' 6 6 subject to renewal. For all state-referred or self-initiated
investigations, the prosecutor is required to notify the Secretary-General about
the situation. 16 7 If the Security Council then makes (or has made) a
determination that the relevant act of aggression occurred, the prosecutor has the
green light to immediately proceed with the investigation. 168 If, however, the
Security Council fails to render a determination that an act of aggression has
occurred within six months of the date of notice, the prosecutor may proceed
with his investigation, provided that he receives requisite judicial approval. 169
This template is, in one sense, a far cry from the long-standing U.S.
objective. Had the ASP opted to make a Security Council resolution a
prerequisite to the ICC's exercise of its aggression jurisdiction, the United
States, along with the remaining four permanent members of the Security
Council, would have been able to exercise marked control over the Court's
aggression docket. 170 That arrangement would likely have provided an
International Criminal Court: Report From the Kampala Review Conference 5 (June 16, 2010),
available at http://www.asil.org/files/Transcript ICC Koh RappBellinger.pdf.
163. Conversation with Jennifer Trahan, supra note 144. See also Trahan, supra note 145, at
69; Padmanabhan, supra note 126, at 14 (noting that both the United Kingdom and France have
maintained that the Security Council should have the last word regarding ICC aggression
prosecutions); Koh, supra note 162, at 16.
164. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter dictates that the Security Council shall determine
the existence of any act of aggression. The impact of the provision is subject to interpretation. The
long-standing U.S. position is that aggression determinations are the exclusive bailiwick of the
Security Council. See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with
Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998) L/ROM/22. This view
appears to have been shared by its fellow permanent member of the Security Council, the United
Kingdom. See SCHABAS, supra note 41, at 136. However, article 39 does not expressly prohibit
other bodies from determining that an act of aggression has occurred. Id. at 137.
165. Amendments to the Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 15 ter. The Court, however, would
then make an independent determination as to whether an act of aggression occurred. Id. art. 15 ter
(4).
166. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
167. Amendments to the Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 15 bis (6) (requiring that the
Prosecutor first find that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation).
168. Id. art. 15 bis (7).
169. Id. art. 15 bis (8) (dictating that the Pre-Trial Division, rather than just a Pre-Trial
Chamber, must authorize the commencement of the investigation).
170. This point was made in the Court's early life, highlighting the shortcomings of a court that
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intangible benefit to the United States. The ability to exert power over the
Court's docket-even if only indirectly and in part-would have meant
regaining a piece of what was lost in Rome, and may well have helped mitigate
some of the existing domestic concerns about the Court. Its most practical
benefit, however, would have been the assurance that neither nationals of the
United States nor those of its allies would ever appear before the ICC on
aggression charges.
This latter aspect was, predictably, a fundamental issue for the Obama
administration. Prior to Kampala, the administration made clear that the Court's
assertion of aggression jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states without
prior Security Council approval remained a concern. 17 1 Notably, however, this
worry is equally averted pursuant to the recent aggression amendments, as these
also place the United States in a position to shield its citizens from ICC
aggression prosecutions. Unlike the remaining crimes within the Court's subject
matter jurisdiction, a national of a non-member state can only come before the
Court on an aggression charge through a Security Council referral.172 In light of
the United States' ability to veto such referrals, U.S. vulnerability-and,
arguably, that of its non-member state ally, Israel-is virtually non-existent.173
Consequently, for so long as the United States remains a non-party to the Rome
Statute, it is effectively guaranteed that its citizens will be shielded from such
prosecutions. Moreover, should the current ICC-U.S. courtship advance to the
point of the United States ratifying the Rome Statute, the United States could
then choose to opt out of the Court's jurisdiction over crimes of aggression, 174
keeping intact the assurance that no U.S. national can be prosecuted for
aggression at the ICC.175
would need Security Council approval in order to prosecute any of the crimes in its jurisdiction.
Mysak, supra note 41, at 280. "[Siome would argue that the degree of US support for a tribunal
directly corresponds to its degree of control over the mechanism." Cerone, supra note 51, at 314.
171. State Department Press Release, Ian Kelly, Daily Press Briefing (Nov. 16,2009), available
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/nov/131982.htm; see also Padmanabhan, supra note 126,
at 4 (noting with concern that "ICC jurisdiction over aggression also poses unique risks to the United
States as a global superpower. It places U.S. and allied leaders at risk of prosecution for what they
view as necessary and legitimate security actions"); id. at 17.
172. Amendments to the Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 15 bis (4) and (5) (providing also
that the ICC may not prosecute a national from a different state for an alleged act of aggression on
the territory of a State that is not a party to the Rome Statute).
173. Indeed, Koh tellingly assumes the impossibility of a Security Council referral by
concluding that, pursuant to the new articles, "No U.S. national can be prosecuted for aggression so
long as the U.S. remains a non-state party." U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Koh.
174. Amendments to the Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 15 bis (4).
175. Koh's remarks appear to assume that the United States would opt out, should it ultimately
ratify. Making specific note of the provision, he concludes "we now ensure total protection for our
Armed Forces and other U.S. nationals going forward." U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments
of Koh. Should this situation come to pass, the United States could well attribute its decision to opt-
out on the basis of the "flawed" ICC definition that was created without U.S. input. There are, of
course, potential downsides to availing of an opt-out provision, such as being "named and shamed"
by interested non-governmental organizations and being subject to political fallout. Shana Tabak,
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IV.
POST-KAMPALA: WHITHER NOW THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT?
As a result, despite its failure to achieve its definitional and jurisdictional
objectives with respect to the crime of aggression, it is not surprising that the
American delegation has since been able to paint its work in Kampala as a
qualified success. 176 These results form an important indicator of the United
States' future with the Court. As Judge Wald rightly predicted, had the
aggression amendments resulted in an added threat to the United States, the
likelihood for ultimate ratification would have been quite bleak.177 With this
risk now averted and the United States on a settled path of cooperative
engagement with the ICC, it seems both timely and appropriate to ask, "What
next?"
A. The Possibility of US. Accession
In considering the future of the U.S.-ICC relationship post-Kampala, it is
worthwhile to review some timely remarks made by U.S. Ambassador Rapp.
While conceding that ICC membership was not under discussion for the United
States "at this time," Rapp went on to note that U.S. ratification of international
treaties has historically been a lengthy process. 178 Making the possibility of the
United States joining the Court seem more likely than in any of his prior
comments on the subject, the ambassador ultimately opined that, "over time,
there's a possibility that we may gain confidence in this institution and that
would enable us to move forward." 179 This would only happen, however, after
the United States has the opportunity to evaluate whether the Court "develop[s]
responsibly," which Rapp indicated would be assessed by whether the Court
Article 124, War Crimes, and the Development of the Rome Statute, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1095
(2009). It seems unlikely, however, that these potential consequences would affect a U.S. decision to
opt-out. The United States seemed impervious to such concerns in Rome, where it advocated
extensively, albeit unsuccessfully, for the inclusion of a 10 year opt-out provision for crimes against
humanity and war crimes. Scheffer, supra note 30, at 19. In parallel, Ambassador Rapp attributes the
inclusion of the opt-out provision to U.S. participation in Kampala. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79,
Comments of Rapp (remarking that "provisions have gone into the statute that can't be changed ...
which will protect the nationals of non-party states like ourselves, or states that opt out . . .. I don't
think that would have occurred were it not for us sort of raising the issues in this conference.").
176. For a contrary view, labeling the outcome in Kampala as a failure, see Brett D. Schaefer,
The US. Loses on Aggression in Kampala, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, June 14, 2010,
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/231855/u-s-loses-aggression-kampala-brett-d-schaefer
(asserting that the United States "failed in its main objectives" regarding the crime of aggression and
that its successful efforts in qualifying the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime represent a
"less than ideal[] achievement").
177. Wald, supra note 74, at 24.
178. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Rapp.
179. Id.
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exhibits an established focus on "crimes that involve truly massive intentional
attacks on civilians."1 80
The logic in this regard is relatively straightforward when one considers
U.S. concerns about the potential for politicized prosecutions at the ICC.
Discussions on this issue tend to turn almost exclusively on the possibility of
U.S. nationals appearing before the Court as a result of unintentional killings
sustained in the context of an otherwise legitimate military undertaking (i.e.,
collateral damage). 18 1 Accordingly, an ICC with a vested and exclusive focus on
the prosecution of acts that involve grave harm intentionally inflicted on
civilians strikes at the very heart of this basis for U.S. opposition.1 82
Indeed, perhaps some American critics have already begun to question this
basis for opposing ICC membership, as virtually every situation before the Court
to date involves civilian victims who are alleged to have suffered grave,
intended harm at the hands of those accused. 183 However, it would be a mistake
180. Id. (Noting that, in this regard, the United States would be evaluating "the decisions made
by its prosecutor on where to open investigations and [the decisions rendered] by [the Court's]
chambers . . . that have to decide whether, sometimes, to authorize those investigations or to issue
arrest warrants.").
181. "Our concern was that a prosecutor who was not under any kind of accountability, who's
elected for nine years, who doesn't answer to any kind of national system, could say, 'Well, over
here, we've got someone who murdered 200,000 people. Over here, we have maybe some soldiers
that came in to protect some of those people, and some folks died in collateral damage. We'll go
ahead and prosecute both."' George Lerner, Ambassador: US. Moving to Support International
Court, CNN, Mar. 24, 2010, http://articles.cnn.conm/2010-03-24/us/us.globaljustice 1 icc-central-
african-republic-war-crimes?_s=PM:US (quoting Ambassador Rapp). Rapp went on to note that this
concern, to some extent, remains. Id.; see also Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998
Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly
Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (2001-2002)
(noting that U.S opposition to the ICC is based upon the Court's potential to exercise jurisdiction
over U.S. nationals for the "inadvertent, unintended loss of civilian life").
182. See, e.g., Richard John Galvin, The ICC Prosecutor, Collateral Damage and NGOs:
Evaluating the Risk of a Politicized Prosecution, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 98 (2005)
(averring that "the ICC Prosecutor would be justified to adopt a policy of generally not pursuing
collateral damage cases because such a policy could help to slowly build a comfort level with the
ICC in the U.S."). Of course, the Statute's threshold requirement for war crimes, its requisite mens
rca of intent and knowledge, and its gravity requirement equally undermine the collateral damage
argument. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8 (1), 30, and 17 (1)(d), respectively. Thus far, however,
these provisions have not proved sufficient to thwart U.S. concerns.
183. See, e.g., Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph
Kony issued on 8 July 2005 and amended on 27 September 2005, } 5 (July 8, 2005) (alleging that
the accused, along with fellow LRA members, "engaged in a cycle of violence and established a
pattern of 'brutalization of civilians'); Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No.
ICC-01/05-01/08, 12 (May 23, 2008) (implicating the accused in acts of rape, torture, pillaging and
outrages on human dignity); Situation on Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of
Arrest for Ahmad Harun (April 27, 2007) (concluding that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the accused contributed to the commission of crimes against humanity). But see Situation in the
Republic of Kenya in the Case of Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuri Muigai Kenyatta & Muhammad
Hussein, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/1 1-01, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summonses to
Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuri Muigai Kenyatta & Muhammad Hussein, T 37 (Mar. 8,
2011) (confirming, as this article goes to press, the Court's first charges based upon a theory of
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to assume that this type of focus alone, even if it becomes part of the fabric of
the ICC, will prove sufficient to prompt U.S. ratification. Ambassador Rapp
certainly does not make this prediction,1 84 and with good reason. If concerns
regarding the potential for politicized prosecutions are at the core of U.S.
opposition to the Court, eliminating this risk simply removes one (admittedly
sizeable) hurdle to ratification; it does not incentivize it. 185
Rather, as there is little to no inducement for the United States to join an
institution that seems incapable of fulfilling its mandate, the potential for future
U.S. membership is likely to turn upon whether the Court's operations evidence
its potential for success. As such, once the ICC has had adequate time to
develop, the relevant question will be whether the Court appears to be making
strides towards becoming the institution it was intended to be. Specifically, this
will involve an analysis of whether the work of the ICC demonstrates that it is
truly a court of last resortl 86 whose actions both legitimately fill the impunity
gapl 87 and create an adequate impetus for states to assume the primary
responsibility for prosecuting international crimes. 18 8
B. A Court ofLast Resort? The Complementarity Connection
It is frequently maintained that the ICC is a "court of last resort,"l 89 a
description that implies that the Court acts only when there is no feasible
indirect co-perpetration).
184. After acknowledging the pivotal importance of the Court's focus and noting that increased
confidence may over time make it possible for the United States to "move forward," Rapp candidly
asks "who knows what the future may hold?" U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Rapp.
185. Rather, it has likely provided the impetus for the recent U.S. overtures of assistance. See
supra note 87 and accompanying text. Indeed, at the press conference during which Ambassador
Rapp noted that the ICC investigations have thus far been "appropriately focused," he also
acknowledged that U.S. assistance presently serves U.S interests. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79,
Comments of Rapp.
I86. "Americans embrace the core vision of the ICC-a fair and effective court of last resort
for victims of monstrous crimes." Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States
Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 415, 432 (2004).
187. In this respect, the bar cannot be set too high, so as to demand that the ICC's actions alone
eliminate impunity. Such expectations are simply unreasonable. See, e.g., Knut Dormann & Robin
Gei83, The Implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic Legal Orders, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
703, 717 (2009). Instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether the Court is investigating situations and
prosecuting cases that would otherwise be inadequately addressed.
188. Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamb. 16.
189. See, e.g., James L. Taubee, A Call to Arms Declined: The United States and the
International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 105, 129 (2000) (noting that "the ICC is
designed to be truly a court of last resort"); Eric Bales, Torturing the Rome Statute: The Attempt to
Bring Guantanamo's Detainees within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 16
TULSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 173, 188 (2009); Ronli Sifris, Weighing Judicial Independence Against
Judicial Accountability: Do the Scales of the International Criminal Court Balance?, 8 CHI.-KENT J.
INT'L COMP. L. 88, 107 (2008).
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alternative forum for investigation and prosecution. 190 This suggestion both
reinforces the Court's role in "put[ting] an end to impunity,"' 9 ' while
concurrently mitigating sovereignty concerns regarding the Court's exercise of
its jurisdiction. It is therefore no surprise that ICC actors have embraced the
designation. 192 Indeed the Court's website, 193 prosecutor, 194 and first
President1 95 all refer to the ICC as a court of last resort. At the same time, it is
commonplace for those operating outside the institution to describe the Court in
the same fashion, including such high profile figures as former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, 196 present UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,1 9' former
ICTY Prosecutor Richard Goldstone, 198 and numerous academics and
journalists.199
When the term "court of last resort" is used in relation to the ICC, it is
almost always linked with the Court's principle of complementarity, which
precludes the ICC from proceeding with an investigation or prosecution when
190. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice and
the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 122 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
191. Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamb. 5; see also id art. 20(3)(a)-(b).
192. It has also been suggested that the Court has "embraced its place as a court of last resort."
Recent Publications, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 533, 546 (2010) (reviewing LEE FEINSTEIN & TOD
LINDBERG , MEANS TO AN END: THE U.S. INTEREST IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(2009)).
193. "The ICC is a court of last resort." ICC at a Glance, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
194. "[T]he Court intervenes as a last resort . . . ." Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int'l
Criminal Court, Address at Nuremberg: Building a Future on Peace and Justice (June 24-25, 2007),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F005461711149/
143825/LMOnuremberg_20070625_English.pdf [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo, Nuremberg
Address]; see also Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005).
195. "This is a fundamental point that has to be understood about the ICC. The ICC is a court of
last resort." Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International
Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 539, 543 (2007); see also Philippe Kirsch, Applying the
Principles of Nuremberg in the International Criminal Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
501, 505 (2007) [hereinafter Kirsch, Applying].
196. Analysis: Mixed Report Card for ICC, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS (June 10,
2010), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportld-89423.
197. Ban Ki-moon, Ushering in a New Age of Accountability, WASH. POST, May 29, 2010, at
A19.
198. Justice Richard J. Goldstone, US Withdrawal from ICC Undermines Decades ofAmerican
Leadership in International Criminal Justice, THE INT'L CRIM. CT. MONITOR, June 2002, at 3,
available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/InternationalWarCrimes/USWithdrawalICC
Goldstone.html.
199. See, e.g., Charles H.B. Garraway, Military Excesses? Is There a Right Way of Dealing?, 2
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 981, 982 (2002); Lauren Fielder Redman, United States Implementation of the
International Criminal Court: Toward the Federalism of Free Nations, 17 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 35, 40 (2007); Estanislao Oziewicz, Court Seeks to Try Suspects for Atrocities in Darfur;
International Tribunal Faces Obstacles in Prosecuting Politician, Militia Leader, GLOBE & MAIL
(CA), Feb. 28, 2007, at Al5.
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the matter is being dealt with properly on the national level. 200 For example,
former ICC President Philippe Kirsch explains the ICC's role as a court of last
resort:
[That role] is reflected in the principle of complementarity. . . .. A case is not
admissible if it is being or has been investigated or prosecuted by a state with
jurisdiction. The ICC will act only if a state is unwilling or unable to genuinely
carry out an investigation or prosecution. 20 1
Let us assume for now that Kirsch's conclusion is true, that is to say that
under the complementarity principle the Court will act only if a state with
jurisdiction is either unwilling or unable to initiate national proceedings. If this
is so, the principle does indeed reflect that the ICC is a court of last resort and,
as a consequence, that the cases it hears will automatically fill an impunity gap.
Significantly, Kirsch's conclusion, and the consequences that come with it,
appears to align with the understanding of the complementarity principle held by
multiple States Parties with respect to this absolutely fundamental aspect of the
Court.
For example, when opening the debate in the Dil (the principal chamber of
the Irish Parliament) on the constitutional amendment required for the country to
ratify the Rome Statute, Ireland's then-Minister for Foreign Affairs explained:
"The Court will be complementary to national legal systems. . .. Only where
the State Party in question is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate the
crimes alleged or to prosecute the accused person may the Court exercise its
jurisdiction."202 The Minister of State of the United Kingdom (while acting on
behalf of the European Union and the European Commission) 203 and an advisor
to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade204 have espoused
similar perceptions of the complementarity principle. Parallel interpretations
appear on the websites of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United
200. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
201. Kirsch, Applying, supra note 195, at 505.
202. International Criminal Court: Statement to the Diil by the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Brian Cowen T.D., on the 23rd Amendment to the Constitution Bill, Apr. 11, 2001, available at
http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Legal%20Division%20Documents/international%20criminal
%20court.pdf; see also Remarks by Mr. Brian Cowen T.D., Minister for Foreign Affairs on the
Launch of the Government Campaign for the 23rd Amendment to the Constitution Enabling the
Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, May, 24 2001, available at
http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Legal%20Division%20Documents/remarks%20by%20cowen.
pdf (noting that "[t]he Court will be complementary to national legal systems, and will operate only
where a State Party is unable or unwilling to investigate alleged crimes").
203. "The court will be complementary to national processes in the sense that it will act where
national systems are unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate a crime, or to bring a prosecution if
the results of the investigation warrant one." Press Release, Diplomatic Conference Begins Four
Days of General Statements on the Establishment of International Criminal Court, UN Press Release
L/ROM/7, Jun. 15, 1998 (quoting Tony Lloyd).
204. "Generally, a case is inadmissible if a state with jurisdiction wishes to investigate or
prosecute. It becomes admissible if the state is 'unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution."' Juliet Hay, Implementing the ICC Statute in New Zealand, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 191, 192 n.10 (2004).
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Nations in New York205 and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.2 06
The principle of complementarity has been correspondingly interpreted and
abbreviated by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur207 and in
numerous academic works. For example, scholars have noted that: "under [the
complementary] regime, the ICC cannot proceed unless the local authorities
'cannot or will not' initiate a prosecution;" 20 8 "[the complementarity] principle
provides that the court can accept cases only where national authorities are
unwilling or unable to handle them;" 209 "[t]he ICC can only intervene if a state
with jurisdiction is 'unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation
or prosecution;"' 2 10 "[tihe ICC is only able to exercise jurisdiction over persons
accused of crimes when States are unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out
investigations or prosecutions;" 2 11 and so on.2 12
205. The diplomatic website highlights what it deems "the most important principles for the
work of the ICC" and places at the top of this list that "the Court can only prosecute if states are
unwilling or unable genuinely to pursue a specific serious criminal offence (principle of
complementarity, Article 17)." The International Criminal Court, FED. FOREIGN OFF.,
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/InternatRecht/lStGHIHintergrund-node.html
(last updated May 27, 2010).
206. "[The ICC] is also 'complementary' to national jurisdictions, which means it will only
proceed with a case when a state is unable or unwilling genuinely to prosecute transgressors on its
own." Significant Elements of the Rome Statute, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE CANADA
(Mar.13, 2010), http://www.intemational.gc.calcourt-cour/significant-elements-significatifs.aspx?
lang-eng#com.
207. "[T]he principle of complementarity on which the ICC is based [provides that] the Court
only steps in when the competent national courts prove to be unable or unwilling genuinely to try
persons accused of serious international crimes." International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60,
606 (Jan. 25, 2005).
208. David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of
Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 38-39 (2006).
209. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1,
6 (2005).
210. Garraway, supra note 199, at 981.
211. Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM J. INT'L L.J. 767, 787 (2002).
212. Amongst far too many examples to exhaustively include here, see, e.g., Hon. David Hunt,
AO, High Hopes, 'Creative Ambiguity' and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 56, 63 (2004); Wedgwood, supra note 33, at 202; Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by
Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 136 (2007); Christopher D. Totten & Nicholas Tyler, Arguing for an
Integrated Approach to Resolving the Crisis in Darfur: The Challenges of Complementarity,
Enforcement and Related Issues in the International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1080-81 (2008); Anne K. Heindel, The Counterproductive Bush
Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 345,
348-49 (2004); Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy within
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CM. J. INT'L L. 197, nn.18-19 (2010); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 287
(2010); Kathleen Maloney-Dunn, Humanizing Terrorism Through International Criminal Law:
Equal Justice for Victims, Fair Treatment of Suspects and Fundamental Human Rights at the ICC, 8
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1. The Prosecutor's Avowed Interpretation
For the purposes of the discussion that follows, however, the most
significant comments about complementarity have come from the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo. Recognizing that the
Rome Statute reflects the diligent efforts of its drafters, Moreno-Ocampo
remarked upon the Court's system of complementarity in his comments about
the work of the ICC in 2007: "[c]areful decisions were made [by the drafters in
Rome] .... a system of complementarity was designed whereby the Court
intervenes as a last resort, when States are unable or unwilling to act." 2 13 This
conclusion more forcefully echoes an observation made by Moreno-Ocampo
shortly after his appointment, when he noted that "[t]he ICC is not intended to
replace national courts, but to operate when national structures or courts are
unwilling or unable to conduct investigations and prosecutions." 2 14
In light of Moreno-Ocampo's espoused interpretation of
complementarity, it seems fair to anticipate that this understanding of the
principle would be reflected in his practice of soliciting voluntary referrals.2 15 In
such cases, the very act of making a voluntary or self-referral may reasonably be
considered evidence of the relevant state's willingness to have the situation
investigated and relevant actors prosecuted.2 16 Accordingly, one would then
expect that the prosecutor would limit his solicitation of self-referrals to states
that are in fact unable to conduct the relevant investigations and prosecutions.
Yet, this has not consistently been the case.
2. The Voluntary Referral Rendered by Uganda
In fact, the first voluntary referral received by the ICC prosecutor was
rendered by Uganda, a state arguably able to conduct its own investigations and
prosecutions, albeit unable to effectuate the arrests of the relevant accused. 217
SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 69, 81 n.54 (2010); Jennifer Trahan, Reflections on the Dificulties of
Enforcing International Justice, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1187, 1203 n.64 (2009). Predictably, this
interpretation of complementarity is also reflected in the media. See, e.g., Jonathan Fanton,
Supporting the Court of Last Resort, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Apr. 21, 2008 (asserting that the ICC,
"[t]he so-called 'court of last resort' is not meant to replace national courts but to have jurisdiction
only when nations are unable or unwilling to act.").
213. Moreno-Ocampo, Nuremberg Address, supra note 194.
214. Moreno-Ocampo, 2003 Paper, supra note 105, at 4.
215. See Schabas, Complenentarity, supra note 100 and accompanying text.
216. Id. at 17.
217. While a state's inability to "obtain the accused" is relevant to a determination of inability
under Article 17, the accused must be elusive "due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability
of [the] national justice system." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3). Moreover, because the ICC
must rely on the cooperation of states to effect its arrest warrants, there is "some doubt as to whether
the ICC would be in a better position to help capture the alleged perpetrators." EL ZEIDY, supra note
117, at 234 (noting in addition that the application of Article 17(3) would be dependent upon a
showing that Uganda initiated relevant domestic proceedings "yet failed genuinely to carry them
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According to Professor Schabas:
It has never been suggested that the Ugandan courts are unable to conduct
prosecutions. Indeed, Uganda's courts are among the best in sub-Saharan Africa.
Nothing in the Court's discussion of the five arrest warrants [issued in relation to
the Ugandan referral] suggests that the matter has arisen. Rather, the prosecutor
and the Government of Uganda have simply decided it would be more convenient
to hold trials in The Hague before the International Criminal Court. 2 18
These circumstances prompt the question of how the prosecutor can so
proceed if the principle of complementarity requires that a state either be unable
or unwilling to investigate or prosecute before the ICC can exercise its
jurisdiction. Until this point, we have assumed that this is what the principle in
fact dictates, focusing in particular on the prosecutor's avowed interpretation of
complementarity. Yet, at the same time that Moreno-Ocampo noted that the
Court "is not intended to replace national courts, but to operate when national
structures and courts are unwilling or unable to conduct investigations and
prosecutions," he also noted that, under the Statute, "[t]here is no impediment to
admissibility of a case before the Court where no State has initiated any
investigation.... In such cases there will be no question of 'unwillingness' or
'inability' under [the Statute]." 2 19
In so stating, the prosecutor endorsed the position advanced by a group of
experts who had advised him on the "legal, policy and management challenges"
he was likely to face "as a consequence of the complementarity regime." 220 The
resultant informal expert paper counseled the prosecutor that "the most
straightforward scenario [with respect to admissibility] is where no State has
initiated an investigation (the inaction scenario)." 22 1 In fact, the report noted that
"[t]here may be situations where the appropriate course of action is for a State
concerned not to exercise jurisdiction in order to facilitate admissibility before
the ICC."222
a. Interpreting the Rome Statute's Complementarity Provisions
To best understand this notion of "inaction admissibility," one must consult
the relevant provisions in the Rome Statute. Article 17 provides in pertinent part
that a case is inadmissible where:
1. (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution;
out").
218. Schabas, Complementarity, supra note 100, at 23.
219. Moreno-Ocampo, 2003 Paper, supra note 105, at 5.
220. Office of the Prosecutor Informal Expert Paper, The Principle of Complementarity in
Practice, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, at 2 (2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/icedocs/doc/
doc654724.PDF.
221. Id.at7.
222. Id. at 19.
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(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute...
According to Darryl Robinson, coordinator of the expert group consulted
on behalf of the prosecutor, the conclusion that Article 17 precludes the Court
from acting unless a state with jurisdiction is either unwilling or unable to
investigate or prosecute represents a failure to recognize the above emphasized
language in the provision. 22 3 Rejecting this construction as one that does not
give equal weight to all terms in Article 17, Robinson explains that the provision
in fact requires an initial determination of "whether a state is investigating or
prosecuting a case (or has done so).",224 Only if the answer to this preliminary
question is "yes" does one then assess the relevant state's ability or willingness
to investigate or prosecute. 225
b. Applying the Rome Statute's Complementarity Provisions
When one applies this understanding of Article 17 to the ICC Uganda
cases, the inquiry begins and ends with the first step of the articulated test.
Because Uganda has neither investigated nor prosecuted the events it referred to
the Court,226 there is no complementarity question. Article 17 does not apply
and the ICC cases are simply admissible. Accordingly, Uganda's willingness to
see the prosecutions take place, as presumably evidenced by the referral it made,
and its apparent ability to conduct these prosecutions domestically are in point
223. Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 CRIM. L.F. 67,
71(2010).
224. Id. at 68.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph
Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 September 2005,1 37 (Sept. 27, 2005) (noting that in
its 2004 "Letter on Jurisdiction" the Ugandan government pronounced that it "has not conducted and
does not intend to conduct national proceedings in relation to the persons most responsible" for the
crimes within the referred situation). This situation is, of course, subject to change. Uganda has since
established a war crimes court as a special division of the Uganda High Court. See, e.g., Uganda sets
up war crimes court, BBC NEWS, May 26, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7420461.stm.
This nascent court is perceived by some as part of a Ugandan plan to thwart ICC prosecutions
because the pending ICC cases have impeded peace negotiations. Id. This development arguably
adds credence to the conclusion that the Ugandan self- referral was rendered for illegitimate reasons.
See, e.g., Schabas, Complementarity, supra note 100, at 19-22 (noting that Ugandan President
Museveni initially made the self referral in order to secure the leverage necessary to bring the
country's rebel forces to the negotiating table). Indeed, more recent events make clear that the
Ugandan president is hardly committed to the goals of international criminal justice. Qaddafi
Offered Refuge in Uganda, CBS NEWS, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2011/03/30/501364/main20048721.shtml, Despite this, it is difficult to take issue with the
sentiment expressed by the head of the new war crimes division of the Uganda High Court who
noted: "It is the duty of [ICC] member states to put in place mechanisms to try people who have
committed atrocities.. . . The ICC has a responsibility to support us." Bill Oketch, Uganda Set for
First War Crimes Trial, INSTITUTE FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Jul. 14, 2010,
http://iwpr.net/report-news/uganda-set-first-war-crimes-trial.
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of fact immaterial. This disconnect between state inability/unwillingness and the
question of complementarity, of course, seems counterintuitive in light of the
preceding discussion. It also stands particularly at odds with the prosecutor's
public acknowledgement that the principle of complementarity "was designed
whereby the Court intervenes as a last resort, when States are unable or
unwilling to act." 227
Applying Robinson's conclusions, however, the Prosecutor's description of
the principle represents nothing more than the "slogan version of
complementarity [that] exercises a powerful grip on popular imagination," 228 a
deduction that equates to a strong, albeit inadvertent, indictment of Moreno-
Ocampo. 229The notion that the Court not act unless a state with jurisdiction is
unwilling or unable to do so is not simply convenient political rhetoric; it was a
fundamental consideration that drove the complementarity discussion at the
Rome Conference and is also absolutely central to the ICC's ability to function
as a court of last resort. Therefore, because inaction admissibility renders the
relevant state's willingness and ability to prosecute of no consequence, it then
ought to be the prosecutor's responsibility to ensure that his use of
"admissibility by inaction" comports with the Court's intended role as an
institution of last resort. This means going forward with inaction matters when
(1) a state's decision not to act is "inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person(s) concerned to justice"2 30 or (2) is the result of some other barrier, such
as when the state is comprised of "[g]roups bitterly divided by conflict [that]
oppose prosecutions at each others' hands."23 1 Above all, faithfulness to the
intent behind the complementarity principle and the notion that the ICC is meant
to function as a court of last resort requires that the prosecutor refrain from
investigating or prosecuting matters whenever a state with jurisdiction is both
supportive of and able to conduct the relevant investigations and prosecutions.
3. The Voluntary Referral Rendered by the Democratic Republic of Congo
Evidence that the prosecutor is not presently committed to ensuring that the
ICC functions as a court of last resort is not limited to the Uganda situation, but
can also be seen in some of the cases born of the second voluntary referral, that
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). When the DRC first referred the
situation on its territory to the ICC in 2006, the country asserted that it was not
227. Moreno-Ocampo, Nuremberg address, supra note 194.
228. Robinson, supra note 223, at 68. Ironically, Robinson elsewhere acknowledges that
"ensur[ing] that serious international crimes do not go unpunished" is "the very raison d'tre of the
ICC." Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the
International Criminal Court, 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 481, 484 (2003).
229. Robinson's article, while replete with examples of so-called "slogan complementarity,"
omits any references to statements made by the ICC prosecutor.
230. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(a)-(c).
231. Moreno-Ocampo, 2003 Paper, supra note 105, at 5.
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then in a position to conduct the necessary investigations without the Court's
assistance.23 2  Some two years later, however, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I
observed that the country's justice system had "undergone certain changes,"
such that "the Prosecution's general statement that the DRC national judicial
system continues to be unable in the sense of [the Rome] Statute does not
wholly correspond to the reality any longer."2 33 This is arguably reflected in the
fact that several of the ICC accused who are presently being tried in The Hague
were being held in the DRC on domestic charges (that included crimes which
fall within the jurisdiction of the Court) at the time that ICC arrest warrants were
issued against them.
a. Complementarity and the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
With respect to the first accused to be tried at the ICC, Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, then-existing domestic charges caused the Pre-trial Chamber that
considered the prosecutor's application for his warrant of arrest to engage in a
complementarity/admissibility assessment. In accord with Robinson's
interpretation set out above, the Pre-trial Chamber noted that "the first
requirement for a case arising from the investigation of a situation to be declared
inadmissible is that at least one State with jurisdiction over the case is
investigating, prosecuting or trying that case, or has done so."234 In this respect,
the Chamber held it "is a conditio sine qua non for a case arising from the
investigation of a situation to be inadmissible that national proceedings
encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case
before the Court." 235 Accordingly, as Lubanga was detained in the DRC with
respect to charges that included genocide and crimes against humanity, 236 and
his ICC case rather involved allegations of enlisting and conscripting child
soldiers, the DRC proceedings did not encompass the conduct that formed the
basis of the prosecutor's application for a warrant of arrest.237 In effect, the
DRC had been "inactive" with respect to the conduct that formed the basis of the
ICC charges,23 8 barring the need for the Pre-trial Chamber to address the state's
232. The referral letter is quoted in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-129, Decision on the Appellant's Application for an Extension of the Time Limit for the
Filing of the Document in Support of the Appeal and Order Pursuant to Regulation 28 of the
Regulations of the Court (May 30, 2006). It provided in relevant part: "En raison de la situation
particulibre que connait mon pays, les autorit6s comp6tentes ne sont malheureusement pas en mesure
de mener des enquetes sur les crimes mentionn6s ci-dessus [crimes internationaux] ni d'engager les
poursuites n6cessaires sans la participation de la Cour p6nale internationale. " Id. 3, n. 4.
233. Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-520-Anx2, Decision




237. Id. f 38-39.
238. Id.T41.
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ability or willingness genuinely to carry out an investigation or prosecution.
In one respect, it is difficult to find fault with this narrow interpretation of
the relevant statutory provision. Article 17 clearly states that "a case is
inadmissible where the case is being investigated by a state which has
jurisdiction over it,"239 and there is little doubt that the disparate charges against
Lubanga address different types of conduct. At the same time, the application of
the "same conduct" test, which has been utilized repeatedly since the Lubanga
arrest warrant decision, 240 is one that seems not to comport with the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute,24 1 setting too high a bar and showing inadequate
deference to national proceedings. As applied, good faith domestic prosecutions
of international crimes are insufficient to preclude an ICC prosecution unless the
national charges are calibrated to address precisely the same conduct that is the
focus of the ICC charges. This aspect of Court practice alone is likely to be used
to argue against U.S. accession 242 despite the "appropriate focus" of the ICC's
proceedings.243
Viewed more broadly, the test is one that lies at odds with the notion of the
ICC acting as a court of last resort. If the International Criminal Court, with its
finite resources, is meant to make any headway with respect to its anti-impunity
mission, it should only be acting with respect to perpetrators who would
otherwise not be held accountable for their international crimes. 244 At the same
time, it is arguably incumbent upon the Court to encourage domestic
proceedings, rather than to subvert or circumvent them, as national prosecutions
are an indispensible aspect of the ICC anti-impunity objective. 245 In effect,
239. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a).
240. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-04, Decision on the
Evidence and Information Provided by the Prosecution for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
against Germain Katanga, 20 (July 6, 2007); Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
02/07-3, Decision on the Evidence and Information Provided by the Prosecution for the Issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest Against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 1 21 (July 6, 2007); Prosecutor v. Harun &
Kushayb, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/07-3, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7)
of the Statute, 1 21 (Apr. 27, 2007).
241. VCLT, supra note 51, art. 31(1).
242. "[C]omplementarity or deference to national justice systems(] like so much else connected
with the ICC [] is simply an assertion, utterly unproven and untested." John R. Bolton, The Risks
and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.
186, 200 (2000).
243. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
244. Schabas likewise argues against the "mechanistic comparison of charges" asserting that
the real assessment should be one that assesses the relative gravity of the domestic charges with
respect to those of the ICC. SCHABAS, supra note 41, at 182. This, of course, would have resulted in
a different outcome for Lubanga. For some compelling arguments against the same conduct test, see,
for example, Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Motion Challenging the
Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the
Statute, 39-43 (Mar. I1, 2009).
245. "There has never been any doubt that the ultimate aim of eliminating impunity for
international crimes cannot be achieved by a single international institution, however effective it
may turn out to be. From the outset, the ICC has been created to act as a catalyst for domestic
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rather than functioning to facilitate "the two overarching purposes in the Rome
Statute: to ... end impunity. . . and to encourage national investigations and
prosecutions of [atrocity] crimes before resorting, if necessary, to the ICC," 24 6
the same conduct test actually serves to impede their attainment. This is an
obvious cause for concern that is further compounded by a recent Appeals
Chamber decision on complementarity rendered in the case of Germain
Katanga. 24 7
b. Complementarity and the Case of Germain Katanga
Like Lubanga, Germain Katanga was detained in the DRC on national
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity2 48 at the time that the ICC
arrest warrant was issued against him. 249 These domestic charges formed the
basis of Katanga's admissibility challenge in which he asserted that the principle
of complementarity precluded the ICC from hearing the case against him. After
Katanga was transferred to The Hague, however, the DRC closed its national
proceedings with respect to him,2 50 a fact that proved of some consequence to
the subsequent Appeals Chamber determination of admissibility. According to
the Appeals Chamber, the admissibility of a case must be determined "on the
basis of the facts as they exist at the time of the admissibility challenge." 25 1 As
such, the Appeals Chamber found that the DRC's termination of its proceedings
against Katanga rendered the state inactive with respect to the accused at the
time of his complementarity challenge.252 This fact-coupled with what might
be described as an unnatural interpretation of Article 17(1)(b) 253-resulted in
prosecutions. . . ." Dormann & Gei8, supra note 187, at 717.
246. David J. Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's Original Intent, 3 J. INT'L
CRM. JUST. 333, 335 (2005).
247. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of
12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, 1 73 (Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Katanga Appeal
Decision].
248. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga pursuant to
Article 19 (2)(a) of the Statute, 11 (Mar. 11, 2009).
249. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for
Germain Katanga (July 2, 2007).
250. The DRC case file was forwarded to the ICC Registrar; this included a letter from the
DRC's General Auditor of the High Military Court which provided in pertinent part that the DRC
proceedings had been closed "in order to facilitate the joinder of the proceedings at the level of the
ICC." Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case, . I1.
251. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Judgment on the Appeal, 1 80.
252. Id.
253. As noted above, Article 17(l)(b) requires the Court to declare a case inadmissible when a
state has investigated the case "and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state not to prosecute."
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the Appeals Chamber's conclusion that there was no bar to the ICC proceedings
and, accordingly, that the DRC's willingness and ability to prosecute the
accused were irrelevant considerations.
In other words, pursuant to the Katanga Appeals Chamber decision, the
prosecutor is not only well placed to prosecute cases that realistically can be
addressed on the national level, but he is also in a position to initiate
investigations and cases despite the existence of relevant, on-going national
proceedings in a state with jurisdiction. Indeed, the only limitation placed upon
the prosecutor's ability to pursue such matters is the requirement that the state
abandon its prosecutorial efforts prior to an admissibility challenge at the ICC.
Given the expense associated with the prosecution of international crimes and
the state willingness evidenced to date to cede jurisdiction to the ICC, the
potential for this is something that cannot easily be dismissed. The bottom line is
that the Appeals Chamber decision facilitates a practice that runs directly
counter to that which was intended for the Court 254 and that is wholly
inconsistent with the ICC's anti-impunity mission and its potential to function as
a court of last resort.
4. Summary
In sum, the Court's interpretation of the Rome Statute's complementarity
provisions does not limit the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction to situations in which
a state with jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to prosecute. Rather, an entire
range of cases falls outside any complementarity analysis pursuant to inaction
admissibility. As such, the only stopgap to potentially unnecessary ICC
investigations and prosecutions is the prosecutorial decision not to pursue such
matters. In effect, then, the principle of complementarity alone cannot ensure
that the ICC functions as a court of last resort. Rather, the Court can only attain
this status when the principle is applied in conjunction with an appropriate
prosecutorial policy.
To date, however, the prosecutor has not implemented this type of process
but rather has, at times, pursued a seemingly opposite course of action, arguably
undermining the Court's anti-impunity goal in the process. Moreover, the case
law born of the prosecutor's policy sets the stage for this problem to be
exacerbated and, possibly, institutionalized. In effect, the Court's jurisprudence
facilitates the commencement of ICC prosecutions despite the existence of
According to the Appeals Chamber, however, this sub-article does not apply to Katanga's case,
"because the DRC did not make any decision not to prosecute [Katanga]." It rather decided "that he
should be prosecuted, albeit before the International Criminal Court." Id. 82. In the opinion of this
author, this analysis is not one that comports with the sub-article's ordinary meaning. Rather, the
Appeals Chambers unconvincingly interprets the phrase "the State has decided not to prosecute" to
mean "the State has decided that the person should not be prosecuted."
254. See, e.g., Press Release, Preparatory Committee on International Criminal Court Continues
Considering Complementarity between National, International Jurisdictions, U.N. Press Release
L/2773 (Apr. 2, 1996).
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genuine, national proceedings, provided that the latter either fail to adequately
conform to the charges subsequently brought by the Court's prosecutor or are
subsequently terminated in favor of the ICC prosecution.
Quite simply, the result is that the ICC is not poised to fulfill its role as a
court of last resort. In the absence of this status, its prosecutions may-but will
not necessarily-contribute to the Court's anti-impunity mission. In this respect,
despite claims to the contrary, 25 5 the actions of the prosecutor and the ICC's
consequent jurisprudence wholly fail to emphasize the integral role that
domestic proceedings must play with respect to ensuring widespread
accountability for the commission of international crimes. When coupled with
the long-standing preference of the United States for national proceedings, 25 6
these facts mean that, at least for the time being, there is no convincing impetus
for the United Sates to move forward in its relationship with the International
Criminal Court.
CONCLUSION
The United States has come a long way in its relationship with the
International Criminal Court. The notion that the United States should isolate
and ignore the Court25 7 has dramatically fallen to the wayside for reasons both
pragmatic and ideological. Mending rifts with the ICC aligns both with the
Obama administration's mission to repair the international reputation of the
United States and Obama's "personal[] commit[ment] to a new chapter in
American engagement." 258 It is likewise a practical endeavor. The ICC does not
appear to be going out of business any time soon. It currently operates with the
255. "A major part of the external relations and outreach strategy of the Office of the
Prosecutor will be to encourage and facilitate States to carry out their primary responsibility of
investigating and prosecuting crimes." Moreno-Ocampo, 2003 Paper, supra note 105, at 5. On the
concept of positive complementarity, for example, William W. Burke-White, Implementing a Policy
ofPositive Complementarity in the Rome System ofJustice, 19 CRIM. L.F. 59 (2007).
256. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. For evidence of this with respect to each of the
three relevant administrations, see Bleich, supra note 26, at 286 n.18 (detailing the Clinton position
in the lead up to the Rome Conference); supra note 52 and accompanying text (with respect to the
Bush Administration); and US. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Rapp (concluding, as a
representative of the Obama Administration, that national prosecutions are the "best approach").
257. The concept was first introduced by John Bolton on the heels of the Rome Conference. Is
a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-32 (July 23, 1998) (Statement of Hon John Bolton, Former
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; Senior Vice President, American
Enterprise Institute).
258. Mark Tran, Barack Obama Defends America's Global Image, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 7,
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/07/obama-defends-us-image (quoting
Obama and also asserting that Obama is "[s]eeking to repair the damage to America's international
reputation by his predecessor, George Bush").
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commitment of 114 states 259 and a docket spawned in part by UN Security
Council referrals.
The present policy of engagement also appears a sensible course of action
in light of some key facts about the early work of the ICC. Initial concerns
regarding the Court's ability to ensure fair trials and discourage international
crimes have not been borne out. Predictions that the ICC would maliciously
interfere with state sovereignty and engage in a practice of politicized
prosecutions have not come to pass. Rather, the nascent practice of the Court
provides evidence that it is committed to protecting due process rights, even
when doing so will undoubtedly contribute to criticism about the ICC's ability to
perform efficiently and effectively. In addition, the international response to the
Court's first prosecution suggests that the ICC's operation has already begun to
have a deterrent effect. Moreover, the Court's prosecutor has not pursued cases
of questionable magnitude, but instead has consistently focused on decidedly
grave acts intentionally committed against civilians. Of comparable significance,
with the prosecutor has made an effort to proceed with the cooperation of states
with jurisdiction.
Longstanding U.S. concerns with respect to the Court's ability to exercise
its jurisdiction over alleged acts of aggression have been even more decisively
put to rest. While the United States did not walk away from the 2010 Review
Conference in Kampala with its most desired outcome, the end result of the
Uganda meeting is something it can easily live with. The United States received
a virtual assurance that no U.S. national, or national of a non-State Party ally,
will ever be prosecuted at the ICC for the crime of aggression. Thus, the U.S.
delegation is right to view the outcome of the Review Conference as a qualified
success. Indeed, the fact that there is no real prospect for the Court to consider
an allegation of U.S. aggression may well help to pave the way towards U.S.
accession to the Rome Statute.
Nevertheless, U.S. membership is unlikely to materialize any time soon.
The United States was initially drawn to back the creation of the International
Criminal Court because it identified the need for a forum in which to try
perpetrators of international crimes when there is no effective national forum for
prosecution.260 Accordingly, it recognizes the Court in its role as an institution
"where justice will be delivered if it can't be delivered at the national or regional
level." 26 1 This suitably aligns with the notion that the ICC is meant to function
as a court of last resort, a designation that implies that the work of the Court
will, by necessity, contribute to its anti-impunity goal.
It is now clear, however, that the Rome Statute alone does not dictate this
259. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited April 7, 2011) (listing 114 members).
260. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
261. U.S. Engagement, supra note 79, Comments of Rapp.
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outcome. Contrary to the belief held by numerous member states, 262 and as the
2009 Katanga Appeals Chamber decision makes clear, the application of the
Statute's complementarity provision does not dictate that the ICC can intervene
only when a state with jurisdiction is unwilling or genuinely unable to
investigate or prosecute. Rather, these limitations do not come into effect unless
and until a state with jurisdiction has initiated relevant national proceedings.
In cases of state inaction, the prosecutor is given a blank check to proceed
as he wishes, free to go forward even in instances where a state with jurisdiction
is able to institute national proceedings and is desirous of prosecution. While it
is indisputable that the ICC should be able to act when states with jurisdiction
blatantly refuse to do so, the absence of any limitations on inaction admissibility
means that the Court may address-and perhaps is presently addressing-
matters that could and, therefore, should, be prosecuted at the national level.
This runs counter to the notion that the ICC is a court of last resort and means
that ICC investigations and prosecutions may not actually contribute to the anti-
impunity mission that fostered the Court's creation.
The prosecutor's decision to initiate an investigation at the behest of a state
that is seemingly able to do so itself and to pursue cases despite the existence of
national proceedings suggests that he is not committed in any real sense to the
notion that the ICC is meant to operate as a court of last resort. This is a
troubling conclusion in light of the fact that the prosecutor's discretion, coupled
with the Statute's complementarity provisions, could ensure that the Court
operates in this fashion. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the
prosecutor's policy has engendered regrettable jurisprudence that is likely to
discourage U.S. ratification.
This is not to suggest that all is lost, however, nor is it meant to imply that
the United States will disregard the prospect of eventual accession. The pursuit
of questionable investigations and cases may be an additional aspect of the
ICC's "teething problems," 263 the result of impulsive decisions designed to
produce quick and demonstrable results. 264 In this respect it might be argued
that the prosecutor's 2009 request for authorization to initiate an investigation
into the situation in the Republic of Kenya, in which the territorial state proved
unable to initiate national proceedings, 265 may be seen to indicate a change in
262. See supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text.
263. Including self-referrals on his list of possible "teething problems" for the ICC, Cassese
notes that the practice "might lead to states using the Court as a means of exposing dangerous rebels
internationally, so as to dispose of them through the judicial process of the ICC." Cassese, supra
note 113, at 436.
264. SCHABAS, supra note 41, at 183-84 (noting that the Prosecutor and the Pre-trial Chamber
that crafted the "same conduct" test in Lubanga may have acted impetuously owing to their desire to
"have a real defendant before the Court").
265. While Kenya is not "unable" to investigate or prosecute in the terms of Article 17(3), its
internal division essentially precluded national proceedings. See supra note 99.
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policy. If this can be established,266 it would indeed represent an important first
step in demonstrating the Court's ability to perform as it was intended.
Under the Statute as presently drafted and interpreted, the most immediate
fix would be for the prosecutor to exercise his discretion in a manner that
ensures that the ICC functions as a court of last resort. In this respect, the
prosecutor could initiate and make public a clear policy under which his office
will only initiate proprio motu investigations when there is a substantial and
verifiable impediment to national proceedings. The prosecutor could likewise
put states on notice that self-referrals will be managed in the same way.267
While it might be unrealistic to expect the current prosecutor to take these steps,
this would be a good way for his successor26 8 to openly avow her commitment
to battling impunity for international crimes by facilitating the ICC's operation
as a court of last resort.
For U.S. accession, however, this may prove insufficient. Avid opponents
of the Court are likely to point out that the practice of investigating and
prosecuting matters that are already the subject of national proceedings could
well be revived when there is no legal impediment to prevent this from
happening. Accordingly, the prospect of the United States joining the Court
would be better enhanced if the matter were addressed by way of statutory
amendment. While it is admittedly difficult for the Assembly of States Parties to
effectuate such amendments,2 69 member states may ultimately decide that this
particular issue calls for action. Indeed, there may be sufficient political will for
this in light of the fact that complementarity, as applied, does not align with
numerous member states' understanding of the principle. The most significant
impetus to effectuate change might well come in time, however, if the
prosecutor's future efforts cause the ICC to be "used as a 'garbage can' into
which national court systems [] dump criminals that they should be punishing at
266. There has been a recent and valid call for the Kenyan situation to "mark a change in
prosecutorial policy" away from the near wholesale practice of self-referrals. Andreas T. Muller &
Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on Trial, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1271 (2010). At this stage,
however, it is difficult to sustain the argument that the Kenyan investigation itself represents such a
change. Indeed, one might credibly argue that the Prosecutor's use of his proprio motu investigatory
powers is simply the result of the fact that it was not feasible for Kenya to self-refer. In this respect,
consider the viewpoint of Hassan Omar Hassan, supra note 99.
267. The fact that a state is both able to investigate and prosecute and is desirous of prosecution
could be cited as substantial reasons why the investigation would not be in the interests of justice.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(l)(c). In the alternative, the Prosecutor cold take his time in
officially responding to the referral, while publicly noting his hope for the able and willing state to
live up to its "duty . . . to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes." Id. preamb. 6.
268. Moreno-Ocampo's term of office is due to conclude in 2012; pursuant to the Rome
Statute, he is not eligible for re-election. Id. art. 42(4).
269. The amendment process is particularly onerous. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121.
Indeed, former ICC President Philippe Kirsch noted the importance of drafting a strong statute as
"later on it will be far easier to get governments to change their minds [about the Court] than it will
to change the statute itself." Brown, supra note 17, at 61.
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the national level."270
In the end, of course, it is impossible to predict with precision what the
future holds for the United States and the International Criminal Court. Most
observers would likely guess that U.S. accession is not to be. Then again, most
observers-with good reason-doubted the possibility of a Security Council
referral, and yet two such referrals have now been made. Likewise, most
observers of the vitriolic campaign against the Court at the start of the decade
would probably never have predicted the present state of cooperative
engagement between the United States and the ICC. Whatever the future may
reveal, however, it seems certain that the United States will not ratify the Rome
Statute until it appears that the ICC is truly functioning as a court of last resort
whose investigations and prosecutions are in fact contributing to its anti-
impunity endeavor. In order for this to happen, changes will have to be made.
270. Press Release L/2773, supra note 254 (quoting the representative of Japan).
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